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The Exclusionary Rule and Causation:
Hudson v. Michigan and Its Ancestors
Albert W. Alschuler*

ABSTRACT: In Hudson v. Michigan, the Supreme Court held that evidence need not be excluded despite the fact that the police had violated the
Fourth Amendment by failing to knock and announce theirpresence before
conducting a search. The Court said that the constitutional violation was
not a but-for cause of the seizure; the police would have obtained the evidence even if they had knocked. Hudson's analysis threatens to withdraw
the exclusionary remedy whenever the police have conducted a search in an
unconstitutionalmanner-most notably, when they have failed to obtain a
warrant before searching. The Court's decision is likely to withdraw the remedy in the cases in which it is most likely to work and to leave the police
with little incentive to conduct searches properly.
Even scholars critical of Hudson have seen the Supreme Court's statement
of the need for but-for causation as "unassailable."In the administrationof
the exclusionary rule, however, the Supreme Court generally has not required
a but-for causal relationship between a police wrong and discovery of the
challenged evidence. Instead it has treated officers who entered without
knocking or without obtainingwarrants as trespassers and has excluded all
evidence that their wrongfulpresence enabled them to obtain.
This approach begged the question of which constitutionalviolations made
the police trespassers and which did not. This Article maintains that the
appropriatequestion in exclusionary rule cases is neither the one traditionally posed by trespass law nor the one posed by Hudson's requirement of
but-for causation. It is instead one of "contributory" causation. Courts
should ask, not whether a constitutional violation enabled the police to obtain evidence they would not have obtained without it, but whether a constitutional violation facilitated the discovery of evidence either by improving
the likelihood of its discovery or by reducingthe work required to obtain it.

*
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INTRODUCTION

What does the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule exclude? Mapp v.
Ohio says it bars "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation
of the Constitution."' Nardone v. United States says it excludes "fruit of the
poisonous tree." 2 Wong Sun v. United States says it "extends as well to the
indirect as the direct products" of Fourth Amendment violations.3 United
States v. Peltier says it suppresses evidence "gained as a result of" Fourth
4
Amendment violations.
All of these formulations pose a question of causation. Did a violation of
the Fourth Amendment cause the government's receipt of evidence that a
defendant now seeks to suppress?
When criminal procedure students consider what the exclusionary rule
excludes, they return to a subject they are likely to have examined at length
in classes on torts and substantive criminal law. For no apparent reason,
however, the vocabulary is different. The opinions speak of "derivative
evidence" and "fruit of the poisonous tree" rather than "proximate cause."
They ask whether the "taint of the primary illegality has dissipated" rather
than whether an "independent intervening cause" has broken the causal
chain.
Students, like their teachers and like Supreme Court Justices, may
assume that the governing principles are the same. As in the law of torts and
crimes, there appear to be two requirements. The first is that the Fourth
Amendment violation must be a sine qua non, "but-for cause," or "cause in
fact" of the discovery of the challenged evidence. The second is that the
violation must also be a proximate cause of this discovery. The first issue is
seen as one of fact, and the second is seen as one of policy. The task at the
second or proximate-cause stage is to choose from all the conditions without
which the discovery of evidence would not have occurred those causes that
5
the courts will treat as causes.

1. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). The Mapp Court intended this statement as a
pithy, one-sentence declaration of its holding. The Court in Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159,
2163 (2006), described it as one of Mapp's "expansive dicta."
2. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
3. Wong Sung v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1962).
4. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 539 (1975).
5. The term "proximate cause" has fallen out of favor among legal scholars because it
does not advance the analysis of causal issues. No substitute has emerged, however, to describe
the second stage of causal analysis. Concepts like duty, foreseeability, relational negligence, and
result within the risk may or may not help. See Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S. Moore, Negligence in
the Air, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 333 (2002) (maintaining that risk analysis is conceptually
incoherent, normatively undesirable, and descriptively inaccurate); see also ALBERT W.
ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, -WORK, AND LEGACY OF JUsTIcE HOLMES 117-22

(2000) (maintaining that foreseeability analysis is conceptually incoherent, normatively
undesirable, and descriptively inaccurate).
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In Hudson v. Michigan, the Supreme Court spoke in conventional causal
language and declared that "but-for causality is only a necessary, not a
sufficient, condition for suppression." 6 Hudson was not the first Supreme
Court decision to declare but-for causation essential,7 and Wayne LaFave,
calls
America's preeminent authority on the law of the Fourth Amendment,
8
the Court's statement of the need for but-for causality "unassailable."
LaFave, however, excoriates Hudson's application of this doctrine. The
Court assumed in Hudson that the police had violated the Fourth
Amendment by conducting a search without appropriately knocking and
announcing their presence. It then declared that their "illegal manner of
entry was not a but-for cause of obtaining the evidence." 9 LaFave calls this
statement "dead wrong." 10 He writes that Hudson "deserves a special niche in
the Supreme Court's pantheon of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, as one
find another case with so many bogus arguments
would be hard-pressed to
1
'
another."
one
atop
piled
I concur with LaFave that Hudson was wrongly decided, but this Article
travels a very different route from his to this conclusion. Endorsing the
statement that he calls "dead wrong," it contends that the failure to knock
and announce in Hudson was not a but-for cause of the police seizure.
Questions of but-for causation must be resolved by asking whether, if
the hypothesized cause were absent, the result would still have occurred. An
Many exclusionary-rule decisions could be described in conventional causal language.
For example, Wong Sun v. United States holds that "but-for" causation is insufficient and that a
suspect's voluntary decision to confess after an unlawful arrest sometimes qualifies as an
independent intervening cause. WongSun, 371 U.S. at 487-88. Brown v. Illinois holds that,just as
tort and criminal decisions follow the consequences of deliberate wrongdoing farther than the
consequences of negligent error, courts must consider "the purpose and flagrancy of the
official misconduct" in determining how far the causal chain from a Fourth Amendment
violation extends. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603 (1975).
Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2164 (2006).
See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 815 (1984) ("[O]ur cases make it clear that
7.
evidence will not be excluded as 'fruit' unless the illegality is at least the 'but-for' cause of the
discovery of the evidence."); see also Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984) (declaring that
exclusion should place the prosecution in neither a better nor a worse position than if no
Fourth Amendment violation had occurred).
6.

Compare the causal statements of Segura and Nix with those of United States v. Ramirez,
523 U.S. 65, 72 n.3 (1998), which noted that a finding of illegality would have required it to
consider whether there was a "sufficient causal relationship" between the illegality and the
discovery of evidence, Powell v. Nevada, 511 U.S. 79, 90-91 (1994), which declared that
"causation is a necessary ...condition for suppression," and United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463,
468 (1980), which said that the challenged evidence must be "in some sense the product of
illegal governmental activity." This Article questions the Hudson and Segura formulations but
not those of Ramirez, Powell, and Crews.
8. 6 WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 11.4(a), at 27 (4th ed. Supp. 2007).
Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2164.
9.
10.

6 LAFAvE, supranote 8, at 24.

11.

Id. at 27.
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appropriate analysis of this question requires envisioning a world as much
like the existing world, as possible apart from the absence of the supposed
causal event. In a case like Hudson, the question is whether the police would
have obtained the challenged evidence even if they had obeyed the Fourth
Amendment. The police, however, might have complied with the Fourth
Amendment in more than one way. For one thing, they might have
complied by abandoning their search, but that scenario does not seem
likely. A more plausible scenario-a "counterfactual" more closely
resembling the actual world-is one in which they have complied with the
Constitution by knocking as the Fourth Amendment requires. Because the
police undoubtedly would have obtained the challenged evidence if they
had knocked, Hudson was correct that their failure to knock was not a but-for
cause of their seizure.
While this Article defends the statement that LaFave considers dead
wrong, it assails the proposition he calls unassailable. The Supreme Court
generally has not required a but-for causal relationship between a
constitutional violation and the discovery of challenged evidence. Instead,
the Court has followed the approach that common law courts took in civil
actions at the time of the framing of the Fourth Amendment. When
government officers failed to obtain a search warrant or to knock and
announce their presence, these courts did not ask whether the officers
would have inflicted the same harm if they had obtained the required
warrant or knocked. Instead, they treated the officers as trespassers and held
them strictly liable for any harm they produced. The courts asked only
whether the officers' wrongful presence was a cause of their seizure, and it
always was. The causal principles followed in search-and-seizure and other
trespass cases differed from those followed in most tort and substantive
criminal law decisions.
The approach of the common law begged a large question: Which
violations of legal requirements turned officers into trespassers, and which
did not? This Article argues in favor of a less ad-hoc standard-one that for
the most part produces the same results as the common law and early
exclusionary-rule cases but that is substantially more protective of Fourth
Amendment rights than the requirement of but-for causation articulated in
Hudson.
The appropriate standard in exclusionary rule cases is one of
"contributory" rather than "but-for" causation. Courts should ask, not
whether a constitutional violation enabled the police to obtain evidence they
would not have obtained without it, but whether the constitutional violation
facilitated the discovery of this evidence. A violation can facilitate the
discovery of evidence either by increasing the likelihood of this discovery or
by reducing the work required to make it.
This Article shows that the standard it proposes is in accord with nearly
all of the results the Supreme Court has reached in exclusionary-rule cases
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and that Hudson's standard of but-for causation is not.' 2 It also contends that
the proposed standard better accommodates the dual rationales of the
exclusionary rule-a rule that seeks both to vindicate the rights of
defendants who have been unlawfully searched and to inhibit future
illegality. It contends that, although Hudson's requirement of but-for
causation accomplishes the former goal (protecting the rights of
defendants), it fails to achieve the latter (providing appropriate incentives
for law observance by the police). It seems odd that the Court has disavowed
the goal that Hudson achieves while endorsing the one it does not.
The development of this Article's thesis will require an analysis of the
rule's objectives and of the ability of the two competing causal standards to
achieve them. This analysis will require examining not only Hudson's ruling
on causation but also two alternative rationales that the Court advanced for
its decision. The Court maintained that the interests protected by the knockand-announce requirement "would not be served by suppression of the
evidence obtained" 13 and that the social cost of excluding this evidence
14
would outweigh the deterrent gain.
Part I of this Article reviews the two sorts of justifications asserted
for the exclusionary rule-"rights" justifications and "instrumental"
justifications-and considers their differing causal implications. A "rights"
theory of the rule seeks (within limits) to restore the victim of a
constitutional wrong to the position he would have occupied had the wrong
not occurred. This theory implies a standard of but-for causation. Excluding
evidence the government would have obtained even in the absence of its
wrong would afford the victim of the constitutional wrong a windfall rather
than vindicate his rights. A fully "instrumental" concept of the rule, however,
might untie the rule from any requirement of causation and bestow
exclusionary benefits whenever they would provide appropriate incentives
for law observance by the police.
Part II examines the twists, turns, and limitations of the concept of butfor causation. It begins by distinguishing two sorts of Fourth Amendment
requirements-rules governing when a search may occur and rules
governing how a search must be conducted. This Part maintains that a fairly
applied requirement of but-for causation ordinarily would lead to the
suppression of evidence only when the police had made a search they
should not have made or had searched in a place they should not have
searched.

12. This Article is in part an exercise in Langdellian "legal science." It seeks to articulate a
principle that may have guided judicial decisions without being fully recognized. See
ALSCHULER, supra note 5, at 86-90 (describing the jurisprudence of C. C. Langdell and other
legal scholars of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).
13.

Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2164.

14.

Id. at 2165.
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When the police have conducted an otherwise constitutional search in
an improper manner, their violation of the Fourth Amendment usually does
not lead to the discovery of evidence they would not have found if they had
conducted the search properly. Moreover, a scenario in which the police
have conducted their search properly is the appropriate "counterfactual
conditional" in judging but-for causality.
Parts III and IV examine the two alternative holdings that, according to
the Hudson majority, also justified its restriction of the exclusionary rule.
Part III considers the claim that, "even given a direct causal connection," the
interests protected by the knock-and-announce requirement "would not be
served by suppression of the evidence obtained." 15 It shows how the Court's
requirement that exclusion must directly serve an interest protected by a
Fourth Amendment rule differs from the similar principle followed in tort
cases and how this principle departs from the instrumental rationale for the
rule favored by the Court for forty years. It also shows how one can
characterize the interests served by Fourth Amendment rules so as to
eliminate as much or as little of the exclusionary rule as one likes.
Part IV addresses the Supreme Court's conclusion in Hudson that the
social cost of excluding evidence obtained after a knock-and-announce
violation outweighs the deterrent benefit. Both the Court's claim that the
costs of exclusion would be high and its claim that non-exclusionary
remedies now can do the job were woefully unconvincing. Hudson allows the
police to violate some Fourth Amendment commands with impunity.
Indeed, the principal beneficiaries of Hudson's restriction of the
exclusionary rule will be officers who violate the Fourth Amendment in bad
faith. Although "rights" theories of the exclusionary rule support Hudson's
limitation of the rule, this limitation frustrates the rule's "instrumental"
objectives. Withdrawing the exclusionary remedy when the police have
conducted a search in an improper manner leaves them with little incentive
to conduct searches properly.
Part V maintains that a contributory-cause standard, one that asks only
whether a Fourth Amendment violation facilitated the seizure of evidence,
would better accommodate the dual rationales of the exclusionary rule. Part
VI then contends that, with only a few exceptions, the Supreme Court's
decisions on the scope of the exclusionary rule have not required a but-for
causal relationship between the police wrong and discovery of the
challenged evidence.
The most significant of these decisions are those excluding evidence
obtained when the police have searched without a warrant. They include
such landmark rulings as Weeks v. United States 6 and Mapp v. Ohio.17 In cases
in which the police would have been entitled to a warrant had they sought
15.
16.
17.

Id. at2164.
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
Mapp v.Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961).
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one, the Court has excluded evidence to enforce a rule about how a search
must be conducted rather than whether it should occur. When the issue is
but-for causation, omitting the constitutionally mandated step of obtaining a
warrant does not differ from omitting the constitutionally mandated step of
knocking and announcing. Neither violation usually leads to the discovery of
evidence the police would not have found if they had conducted the search
properly. The Supreme Court's longstanding exclusion of evidence simply
because the police searched without warrants cannot be reconciled with the
requirement of but-for causation developed by the Hudson majority.
Several recent decisions reveal the Supreme Court's reluctance to use
the exclusionary remedy to enforce rules concerning how a search must be
conducted, but most of these decisions are consistent with a contributorycause standard. They include United States v. Ramirez,18 Segura v. United
States, 9 Murray v. United States,2 ° and Wilson v. Layne.21 One decision prior to
Hudson, however, was clearly incompatible with the contributory-causation
standard proposed by this Article-Nix v. Williams, in which the Court
admitted unlawfully seized evidence that the government "inevitably" would
have discovered in a lawful manner.2 2 Courts could modify a contributorycause standard, however, to accommodate a limited "inevitable discovery"
exception.
I.

23

TWOJUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND WHERE THEY LEAD

A.

"RIGHTS"JUSTIHCATIONS

At its inception, and for many decades thereafter, the exclusionary rule
rested at least in part on what Yale Kamisar called a "principled basis" rather
than "an empirical proposition." 24 In Boyd v. United States, the Court
maintained that unlawfully seizing a person's papers was akin to forcing him
to supply evidence in violation of his privilege against self-incrimination. 25 In
Elkins v. United States, the Court spoke of the "imperative of judicial

18. United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65 (1998).
19. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984).
20. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988).
21. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
22. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
23. Part VI also discusses New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990), in which an unlawfully
arrested suspect made two statements to the police. The Supreme Court held the second of
these statements admissible but approved exclusion of the first. This Article maintains that,
although admitting the second statement was incompatible with the proposed standard of
contributory causation, exclusion of the first was incompatible with the standard of but-for
causation approved in Hudson.
24.

Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "PrincipledBasis" Rather

than an "EmpiricalProposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REv. 565, 565 (1983).
25. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 633 (1886).
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integrity."2 6 And in Mapp v. Ohio, the Court declared that the exclusion of
improperly obtained evidence was
the Fourth Amendment's "most
27
important constitutional privilege."
More basically, the exclusionary rule deprives the government of part of
the profit it otherwise might derive from a constitutional wrong. It also
implements in an incomplete fashion a basic remedial principle-that
courts should place the victim of a wrong in the position he would have
occupied had the wrong not occurred.28 Although most discussions of the
exclusionary rule are devoted to analyzing its forward-looking behavioral
effects, how firmly one believes that the government should not profit from
29
its wrong seems more likely to determine what he thinks of the rule.
Ordinary remedial principles often yield when the victim of a wrong is a
wrongdoer himself. Hardly anyone would place the victim of an unlawful
search in the position he would have occupied had the search not occurred
by returning to him property he had stolen or contraband he possessed. The
same sentiments that lead even the most enthusiastic proponents of the
exclusionary rule to oppose the return of heroin to an accused drug dealer
lead others to resist exclusion of the heroin at the alleged dealer's trial.
When either the government or an accused criminal must receive an
undeserved benefit, it becomes necessary to weigh incongruities, which is

26.

Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960); see also Olmstead v. United States,

277 U.S. 438, 484 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the need to "preserve the
judicial process from contamination").
27. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961). One non-instrumental justification for the
rule emphasizes that the Supreme Court has come to view privacy rather than property as the
principal value protected by the Fourth Amendment. See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967). A return of property is the most obvious remedy for an improper deprivation of
property, but a return of property cannot remedy a wrongful invasion of privacy. Courts have
sought to limit the effects of improper intrusions on privacy by forbidding the use of wrongfully
obtained information. When a police officer reveals unlawfully obtained information in court,
not only does he know things he is not entitled to know, but others-the judge, jurors, and
spectators-know these things as well. Every use of improperly obtained information may
aggravate a wrongful invasion of privacy. Cf Dodge v. United States, 272 U.S. 530, 532 (1926)
("If the search and seizure are unlawful as invading personal rights secured by the Constitution
those rights would be infringed yet further if the evidence was allowed to be used.").
28. SeeJerry E. Norton, The Exclusionary Rule Reconsidered: Restoring the Status Quo Ante, 33
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 261, 266 (1998); William A. Schroeder, Restoring the Status Quo Ante: The
Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule as a Compensating Device, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 633, 637
(1983).
29. This Article lumps together three somewhat different ideas-that exclusion vindicates
the rights of the defendant before the court, that it prevents unjust governmental enrichment,
and that it protects judicial integrity. What it calls "rights"justifications might more precisely be
called non-instrumental justifications. People who endorse one of the three ideas usually
endorse the others, and the causal implications of all three ideas are similar. When
governmental wrongdoing is not a but-for cause of the receipt of evidence-when the
government would have presented the same evidence anyway--excluding this evidence is not
necessary to protect the rights of the defendant, to prevent unjust enrichment, or to preserve
the integrity of the forum.
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what Justice Holmes did when he endorsed the rule: "I think it a less evil
that some criminals should escape than that the Government should play an
ignoble part."30 Both the arguments supporting and those opposing "rights"
justifications for the exclusionary rule are sufficiently plausible that each
side should respect the other's position.
A rights-based conception of the exclusionary rule entails a concept of
but-for causation. The object of the rule is to restore the status quo ante
within limits. If the government would have obtained the challenged
evidence even in the absence of its wrong, the Fourth Amendment does not
require exclusion.
B.

"INSTRUMENTAL "JUSTIfICATIONS

In Linkletter v. Walker in 1965, the Supreme Court declared that "the
purpose [of Mapp v. Ohio, an earlier decision requiring state courts to
exclude unlawfully obtained evidence,] was to deter the lawless action of the
police." 31 Since Linkletter, the Court has repeatedly called deterrence the
primary justification for exclusion,3 2 once suggesting that it may be "the sole
one" 33 and proclaiming on another occasion that it is the rule's "single and
distinct purpose." 34 The Court has demoted what Elkins v. United States called
"the imperative of judicial integrity," declaring that a concern for integrity
"has limited force as a justification for the exclusion of highly probative
evidence." 35 The Court repeatedly has endorsed other language that
appeared in the Elkins opinion: "The rule is calculated to prevent, not to
repair. Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to
36
disregard it."
All of these statements misconceive the principal instrumental
justification for the exclusionary rule. Although the rule may influence
police conduct, it does not deter. In ordinary usage, the word deterrence
refers to discouraging behavior through fear of punishment. It does not
encompass all means of influencing behavior.3 7 And a rule that simply
restores the status quo ante does not punish. Even when the rule limits or
30.

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes,J., dissenting).
31.
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961)). The Court also wrote, "[A]l1 of the [recent] cases... requiring the exclusion of illegal

evidence have been based on the necessity for an effective deterrent to illegal police action." Id.
at 636-37.
32. E.g., Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442-44 (1984); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486
(1976).

33. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976).
34. Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 413 (1966).
35. Stone, 428 U.S. at 484-85.
36. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
37. See THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 362 (rev. ed. 1975) (defining "deter" as
"to restrain from acting or proceeding, as through fear or doubt").
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leaves him with nothing
eliminates an officer's improper gain, it ordinarily
38
Amendment.
Fourth
the
violating
by
to lose
A case described by a former Assistant U.S. Attorney in Chicago
indicates how little the exclusionary rule deters. The members of a federalstate task force had searched an automobile, seized drugs, and arrested the
vehicle's occupants. This search gave them grounds to search the arrestees'
apartment, which they proceeded to do without a warrant. Recognizing that
the drugs seized in the apartment would be suppressed, the Assistant U.S.
Attorney asked the officers why they had not obtained a warrant. They
explained that another officer was retiring from the Chicago Police
Department that day and that seeking a warrant might have made them late
39
for his party.
The exclusionary rule may indeed influence conduct in the way Elkins
mistakenly called deterrence-by removing one incentive to violate the
Fourth Amendment. In the case just described, this influence was weak
because the automobile search had given the officers ample evidence to
ensure the suspects' convictions, and this influence is weaker still when the
police search primarily to gain intelligence, recover contraband, improve
their arrest records, harass people they don't like, or accomplish any goal
other than prosecuting and convicting a suspect. In addition and more
importantly, the exclusionary rule influences police conduct in a more
positive way.
Forty years ago, when Dallin Oaks was thinking about writing his classic
article Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure,40 he remarked in
conversation that he hoped to determine whether Fourth Amendment
violations had declined in frequency following the decision in Mapp v. Ohio.
I asked Oaks how he would ascertain the incidence of unlawful searches in
non-exclusionary-rule states before Mapp in view of the fact that the legality
or illegality of police searches almost never came before the courts. For a
moment, Oaks appeared startled. It is startling that, until 1961, judges in
nearly half the states had almost no occasion to give legal guidance to the
police.

41

38. But see infra Part II.A (discussing the distinction between rules governing when a
search may occur and rules governing how a search must be conducted).
39. Interview with a former Assistant U.S. Attorney, in Chicago, Illinois (Dec. 28, 2007).
40. Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV.
665 (1970).
See Elkins, 364 U.S. at 225 (appendix reviewing the law in each state). Oaks ultimately
41.
focused on laws prohibiting gambling and the sale and possession of weapons and narcotics. He
demonstrated that the enforcement of these laws is highly dependent on police searches and
seizures and hypothesized that if unlawful searches were occurring in non-exclusionary-rule
jurisdictions prior to Mapp and if Mapp had reduced their incidence, the total number of arrests
and convictions for these offenses should have declined. Oaks found little evidence of any

decline in Cincinnati, but a later study of other jurisdictions by Bradley Canon presented a
more complicated picture. Compare Oaks, supranote 40, at 690-91, with Bradley C. Canon, Is the
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The repeated articulation of Fourth Amendment norms-not only in
Supreme Court decisions but also in everyday interaction between the courts
and local police departments-can influence police conduct. LaFave notes
that one sees the exclusionary rule's effects "in the use of search warrants
where virtually none had been used before, stepped-up efforts to educate
the police on the law of search and seizure where such training had been
virtually nonexistent, and the creation and development of working
relationships between police and prosecutors .
"..."42
The Supreme Court's
view of how the exclusionary rule works seems essentially backwards. The
rule does not operate primarily by altering a short-term pleasure-pain
calculus or by frustrating a police officer's distinctive blood lust. 43 It works
over the long term by allowing judges
to give guidance to police officers who
44
it.
receive
to
willing
prove
ultimately
An instrumental view of the exclusionary rule would untie it from any
requirement of a causal relationship between a governmental wrong and the
challenged evidence. Critics of the rule note that when an unlawful search
uncovers no evidence, the rule affords no remedy. 45 If the exclusionary rule
is inadequate to protect the innocent, however, it could be revised. As
reformulated by a committee of welfare economists, the rule might provide
that whenever an unlawful search has produced no evidence, all evidence
seized by the police in their next lawful search (or their next six lawful
searches) must be suppressed. A defendant who benefited from this
suppression would receive an undeserved boon, but if one discounts "rights"
justifications for the rule, so does a defendant who persuades a judge to
suppress evidence today. This defendant too receives a windfall for the sake
Exclusionary Rule in FailingHealth? Some New Data and a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62

KY. L.J. 681, 704-05 (1973).
42.

1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

§ 1.2(b), at 33 (4th ed. 2004) (footnotes and citations omitted).
43. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), and its progeny declare the exclusionary rule
inapplicable to violations of the Fourth Amendment by officials other than police officers. Leon
explains that "no evidence suggest[s] that [these officials] are inclined to ignore or subvert the
Fourth Amendment or that lawlessness among these actors requires application of the extreme
sanction of exclusion." Id. at 916. For criticism of the Court's efforts to generalize about
occupational groups, see Albert W. Alschuler, "Close Enough for Government Work": The
Exclusionary Rule After Leon, 1984 SuP. CT. REV. 309, 351-57.
44. I have noted:
Critics of the exclusionary rule may have followed too closely Justice Holmes's
advice to view the law from the perspective of a "bad man" who wishes only to
evade it. From a "bad cop" perspective, it is easy to ridicule the exclusionary rule's
supposed deterrent effects ....
[A]though the "bad cop" deserves attention, the
"good cop" merits notice as well.
Albert W. Alschuler, Fourth Amendment Remedies: The Current Understanding, in THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 197, 203-04 (Eugene W. Hickok, Jr.
ed., 1991).
45. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757,
785-800 (1994).
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of giving appropriate incentives to the police. 46 William Landes and Richard
Posner write that "the idea of causation can largely be dispensed with in an
also can
economic analysis of torts," 47 and the concept of causation
48
evaporate in a consequentialist analysis of the exclusionary rule.
No one can know what level of "deterrence" through exclusion is
optimal, especially when exclusion achieves its instrumental goals primarily
through long-term guidance and habit formation rather than push-pull
deterrence. Ignorance may be bliss, however, for it enables judges and
scholars to assert that almost any rule they like produces "sufficient"
deterrence. Perhaps excluding the fruits of every other unlawful search
would yield sufficient deterrence, or perhaps excluding the fruits of every
search conducted within one week of an unlawful search would be better. Or
perhaps rules based on traditional causal principles are, like Baby
Bear's bed, just right.49 Like most "positive" economic analysis of law, the
pronouncements are simply deus ex machina. They rest entirely on assertion.
46. See, e.g., People v. Young, 449 N.Y.S.2d 701, 704 (N.Y. 1982) (declaring that the
"purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to redress the injury to the accused's privacy... [but]
to deter future unlawful police conduct").
47.

WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW

229 (1987).
48. Economists, to be sure, tell 'just so" stories in which conventional rules of causation
promote efficient behavior. In analyzing the law of torts and crimes, however, they defend
incompatible causal principles. In criminal cases, they suggest that a sentencing judge can
promote efficiency by assessing the harm a criminal has caused and multiplying this harm by a
number reflecting the ex ante chance the crime would go undetected. See, e.g., Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1193, 1213-27 (1985). This
sort of sentence can ensure that crime will not pay. Were it not for the fact that many criminals
are insolvent, however, economists maintain that criminal law could be abandoned altogether.
Like the criminal law, the law of torts determines the optimal price for the harm a wrongdoer
has caused, and if all criminals could pay the full social costs of their behavior, the deterrence
of antisocial conduct could be left to tort law. See id. at 1203-04.
Tort law, however, sets a very different price from the law of crimes. Both prices
cannot be optimal. Unlike the law of crimes, the law of torts does not sanction attempted
wrongdoing-conduct that causes no harm. In addition, tort law usually omits any multiplier to
account for the possibility of non-detection. See Keith N. Hylton & ThomasJ. Miceli, Should Tort
Damages Be Multiplied?,21J.L. ECON. & ORG. 388, 390-92 (2005). It also omits damages incurred
by people not before the court-for example, the costs of the societal fear generated by
wrongful conduct and the costs of maintaining police departments and courthouses. Indeed,
rules of "proximate causation" limit a wrongdoer's obligation to internalize even costs he has
caused to the plaintiff before the court. Economists speculate, however, that "proximate
causation" requirements can promote efficiency by saving the cost of calculating improbable
harms and by saving the legal system the cost of remedying them See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER,
supra note 47, at 243-55. Some of these stories might be plausible in isolation, but not all of
them together. Economists strain to produce consequentialist rationalizations for causal
requirements that unmistakably were designed to serve the nonconsequentialist goals of
corrective justice and retribution.
49. See, e.g., Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984). The Court stated:
The independent source doctrine teaches us that the interest of society in deterring unlawful police conduct and the public interest in having juries receive all
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In view of the weakness of the exclusionary rule as a deterrent, the rule
might indeed provide more appropriate incentives if it excluded all
evidence seized by the police in their next lawful search following an
unlawful search that yielded no evidence. 50 Suppressing evidence whose
discovery bore no causal relationship to the government's wrong, however,
would seem bizarre. Its strangeness would not flow from ajudgment that the
instrumental calculus supporting it was less plausible than that supporting
the current rule. Divorcing the exclusionary rule from causal requirements
would be odd because almost no one-perhaps not even Richard Posnertruly discounts "rights" theories and ideas of corrective justice entirely. As a
later section of this Article will explain more fully, an appropriate vision of
the rule must accommodate both of its dual rationales.
C.

THE SUPREME COURT'S ENDORSEMENT OF "RIGHTS" THEORIES IN
SOME CASES AND "INSTRUMENTAL" THEORIES IN OTHERS

Hudson's tilt toward "rights" theories of the exclusionary rule in judging
questions of causation departs sharply from the Supreme Court's general
insistence that the primary or exclusive purpose of the rule is deterrence.
The Court, however, has made a similar shift in another area of Fourth
Amendment adjudication. In deciding whether a defendant has standing to
invoke the rule, 51 the Court has insisted that, whatever the instrumental
probative evidence of a crime are properly balanced by putting the police in the
same, not a worse, position that they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred."
Id.; see also United States v. Johnson, 380 F.3d 1013, 1014 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.). Judge
Posner wrote:
The independent-source and inevitable-discovery doctrines are easily collapsed into the familiar rule of tort law that a person can't complain about a violation of his
rights if the same injury would have occurred even if they had not been violated.
To punish a person for an act that does no harm is not required in order to deter
harmful acts.
Id.
50. Perhaps, because the police could easily manipulate this rule, it would be better to
suppress all evidence the police had seized in the lawful search immediately preceding an
unlawful search that yielded no evidence.
51.

The Supreme Court does not like the word "standing," but I refuse to give it up. The

Court wrote in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139 (1978), "[W]e think the better analysis
forthrightly focuses on the extent of a particular defendant's rights under the Fourth
Amendment, rather than on any theoretically separate, but invariably intertwined concept of
standing." Uttering the forbidden word in an argument before the Court causes a duck to drop
from the ceiling andJustice Kennedy to lecture the offender that the Court has "abandoned the
idea of 'standing' in the Fourth Amendment context." 64 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2033, 2037 (Oct.
14, 1998). The Supreme Court gives similar lectures to lower courts: "The Minnesota courts
analyzed whether respondents had a legitimate expectation of privacy under the rubric of
'standing' doctrine, an analysis which this Court rejected 20 years ago in Rakas." Minnesota v.
Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 87 (1998). Although some lawyers and commentators have argued for
extending standing to parties whose rights have not been violated, the concept recognized by
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benefits of exclusion, this defendant must show that exclusion would remedy
a violation of his rights.
A notable example is United States v. Payner, in which the Internal
Revenue Service used a woman to lure a visiting Bahamian bank officer from
his Miami apartment.52 An IRS operative then entered the apartment with a
key supplied by the woman, took the officer's briefcase, and photographed
approximately four hundred documents that he found inside. This violation
of the Fourth Amendment was deliberate, and a federal district court found
that the IRS had "affirmatively counselled] its agents that the Fourth
Amendment standing limitation permits them to purposefully conduct an
unconstitutional search and seizure of one individual in order to obtain
evidence against third parties." 53 Few cases could present stronger
"deterrent" reasons for excluding evidence than Payner, but because the
improperly seized evidence was offered against a bank customer rather than
the bank officer whose rights were violated, the Supreme Court held that the
district court lacked authority to exclude it. 54 The Court wrote that
"unbending application of the exclusionary sanction to enforce ideals of
governmental rectitude would impede unacceptably the truth-finding
" 55
functions ofjudge and jury.
A basic difference between decisions like Hudson and Payner, which
emphasize "rights" justifications for the exclusionary rule, and the more
numerous decisions insisting that the rule is all about deterrence seems
clear. The Court has invoked the "deterrence rationale" as a reason for
refusing to apply the rule when, despite a violation of the rights of the
defendant before the Court, the likelihood of deterrence appeared to be
low-for example, in cases initially decided prior to Mapp, cases in which
57
officers relied on the erroneous legal conclusions ofjudges and legislators,
and cases in which the question was whether to exclude evidence in
the Court before Rakas was never "theoretically separate" from the extent of a particular
defendant's rights. The word "standing" was simply a convenient shorthand way of referring to
the doctrine that a litigant may assert only his own rights, not the rights of other people.

Scholars like Wayne LaFave have refused to yield to the Court's linguistic tyranny, and the
Court has continued to quote them with approval. See Brendlin v. California, 127 S. Ct. 2400,
2408 (2007) (quoting Professor LaFave for the proposition that a passenger has "standing" to
challenge the unlawful stop of an automobile).
52. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
53. Id. at 730 (internal citation omitted).
54. Id. at 735-36.
55. Id. at 734.
56. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965) (refusing to "make the rule of Mapp
retrospective").
57. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918-25 (1984) (refusing to apply the
exclusionary rule when police officers executed a search warrant erroneously issued by a
magistrate judge); see also Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349-55 (1987) (refusing to apply the
exclusionary rule when police officers made a warrantless search in reasonable reliance on an
unconstitutional statute).
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proceedings that the Supreme Court said were outside an offending officer's
"zone of primary interest."58 In standing and causation cases, however,
"rights" theories supply reasons for restricting the rule, while "instrumental"
theories argue against restriction. The Court shifts to whichever reason for
exclusion gives it a reason not to exclude.
II.

THE MEANING AND LIMITATIONS OF BUT-FOR CAUSATION

A.

TWO TYPES OF FOURTHAMENDMENT RULES

When the police lack probable cause to search a dwelling, the Fourth
Amendment generally requires them to stay out; and when the police have
probable cause, the Fourth Amendment supplies rules about how the search
must be conducted. Most of these rules are subject to exceptions, but
ordinarily the police must obtain a warrant, knock and announce their
presence,
seize only items named in the warrant, and use only reasonable
59
force.
The Constitution's rules about when a search may occur differ from its
rules about how a search must be conducted in at least two respects. First,
the rules about when the police may search are the Fourth Amendment's
primary safeguards of property and privacy. People care more about
whether the police will come in than about whether they will come in with a
piece of paper or without one. Although knocking and announcing can
reduce the terror of a police entry, even the requirement of notice is
secondary to the requirement of evidentiary justification for the search. The
Fourth Amendment's central mission is to keep the police out when they
don't belong in.
Second, the exclusionary rule is more likely to induce compliance with
rules about how a search must be conducted than to induce compliance
with rules about when a search may occur. When the police lack probable
cause for a search and cannot easily get it, they may nevertheless search and
recover incriminating evidence. The evidence they seize may be suppressed,
and a criminal may escape punishment. If the police had not conducted
their illegal search, however, the criminal would have escaped punishment.

58. See, e.g., Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998) (refusing to apply the
exclusionary rule in parole revocation proceedings); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032
(1984) (refusing to apply the exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings); United States v.
Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (refusing to apply the exclusionary rule in federal civil tax
proceedings in which the evidence was seized by state law enforcement officers); United States
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (refusing to apply the exclusionary rule in grand jury
proceedings).
59. Fourth Amendment rules also limit the places within a dwelling where the police may
search. For purposes of this Article, these rules should be regarded as rules requiring the police
to stay out (that is, to stay out of particular places) rather than as rules about how they must
conduct a search.
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James Madison and the Fourth Amendment, not the exclusionary rule,
would have set him free.
In cases in which the issue is simply whether to search or not, the police
ordinarily have nothing to lose by searching in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. Moreover, they often have something to gain. Their search
may allow them to recover contraband, harass the suspect, arrest the suspect,
press the suspect to become an informant, or even seize evidence that later
can be used against someone who lacks standing to challenge the search or
against anyone in a civil tax proceeding, deportation proceeding, grand jury
proceeding, plea negotiation session, and more.
When the question is whether to obtain a warrant or knock, however,
the police do have something to lose. 60 In this situation, the suspected
criminal will not go free either way. He will avoid punishment only if the
police break the rules. A nearly costless step is likely to make all the
difference.

61

The exclusionary rule can better enforce the rules that make less
difference in people's lives. 62 With "inevitable discovery" and "independent
source" cases set aside, 63 making a search the police should not have made is
always a but-for cause of their seizure of whatever they find. If the police had
stayed out as the Constitution required, they would not have obtained this
evidence. But rules about how a search must be conducted make less
difference in people's lives partly because such rules do not block the
discovery of evidence. Hudson's requirement of but-for causation appears
largely to withdraw the exclusionary remedy when the police have violated
one of these rules. As conceived by Hudson, the requirement of but-for
causation abandons the exclusionary remedy in the cases in which it is most
likely to achieve its goals.
On rare occasions, conducting a search in an improper manner can
reveal evidence the police would not have found if they had conducted the
search properly. When police officers with a warrant to search for a stolen
elephant break into a house without knocking, they may find an occupant
60.
More precisely, the police are unlikely to gain a benefit they otherwise could easily
have obtained.
61.
See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 540 (1988) ("An officer with probable cause
sufficient to obtain a search warrant would be foolish to enter the premises first in an unlawful
manner. By doing so, he would risk suppression of all evidence on the premises.").
62.
Studies by Bradley Canon and others showed a substantial increase in the use of search
warrants following the decision in Mapp v. Ohio. See Canon, supra note 41, at 714 (reporting an
increase in the use of search warrants following Mapp); Neil A. Milner, Supreme Court Effectiveness
and the Police Organization, 36 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 467, 475 (1971) (reporting the same
increase in New York City); Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjuiy, and the Heater Factor: An
Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 124 (1992) (reporting
the same increase in Chicago); Timothy Perrin et aL., If It's Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the
Exclusionary Rule, 83 IOwA L. REV. 669, 700 (1998) ("[Flew would dispute . . . that there has
been a large increase in the use of search warrants since Mapp.").
63.

See infra Part VI.F.
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placing a bag of cocaine in a drawer. Because the police could not lawfully
have opened this drawer while searching for the elephant, they would not
have found the cocaine if they had delayed their entry briefly by knocking.
Ordinarily, however, conducting a search in an improper manner yields no
evidence the police would not have found if they had conducted the search
properly. With a warrant to search for drugs rather than an elephant, the
police would have discovered the cocaine in the drawer. Justice Scalia's
majority opinion in Hudson accordingly declared that the "illegal manner of
64
entry was not a but-for cause of obtaining the evidence."
B. BUT-FOR CA USA TION: NOT AS EASY AS IT LOOKS
Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion for himself and three other Justices
responded to Justice Scalia's statement:
[T]aking causation as it is commonly understood in the law, I do
not see how that can be so ....

Although the police might have

entered Hudson's home lawfully, they did not in fact do so. Their
unlawful behavior inseparably characterizes their actual entry; that
entry was a necessary condition of their presence in Hudson's
home; and their presence was a necessary condition of their
65
finding and seizing the evidence.
By speaking of an unlawful entry rather than an unlawful manner of
entry, Justice Breyer made the question of but-for causation appear to be a
word game. By characterizing the wrong broadly rather than narrowly, he
produced an outcome he liked. 66 Rumor has it that Justice Breyer recently
attended a wedding at which the bride broke the rules of etiquette by
wearing scarlet rather than white. Justice Breyer remarked, "But for her
improper dress, she would have been naked."
A unanimous Supreme Court (including Justice Breyer) declared in
United States v. Ramirez that, although unnecessarily destroying property
during a search violates the Fourth Amendment, this violation does not
require the suppression of evidence seized during the search.67 Smashing
the front door in a case like Hudson can, I think, be distinguished from
smashing a vase (or even a person) once inside, 68 but Justice Breyer's word
game provides no distinction. When the police have smashed a vase
needlessly, one could say that although the police might have searched
lawfully, they did not; that their unlawful behavior inseparably characterized
64.

Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2164 (2006).

65.

Id. at 2177 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

66. Justice Breyer calls himself a pragmatist. See Linda Greenhouse, Portraitof a Pragmatist;
ConfirmationHearingfor Breyer Elicits His Emphasis on Rulings'Lasting Impacts, N.Y. TIMES, July 14,

1994, at Al (calling Breyer "a self-described pragmatist"); see also Cass R. Sunstein,JusticeBreyer's
DemocraticPragmatism,115 YALE L.J. 1719 (2006).
67. United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71 (1998) (dictum).
68. See infra
Part VI.B.
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the entire search; and that, if they had not searched, they would not have
69
found the challenged evidence.
In philosophers' language, a "counterfactual conditional" asks what the
world would be like if one aspect of the world were changed. Questions of
but-for causation are answered by envisioning counterfactual conditionals.
Specifically, when the standard for determining what evidence will be
excluded includes a requirement of but-for causation, one must ask what the
world would be like if the police had obeyed the Fourth Amendment. Would
they still have obtained this evidence?
Behind the word game in Hudson was an apparent duel of
counterfactuals. Justice Scalia envisioned a world in which the police
complied with the Fourth Amendment by knocking and announcing their
presence. In this world, the police would have obtained the challenged
evidence. Justice Breyer envisioned a world in which the police complied
with the Fourth Amendment by never entering Hudson's premises at all. In
his counterfactual world, the police would not have seized this evidence.
The number of imaginary worlds in which the police have obeyed the
Fourth Amendment is infinite.
A pragmatist might view the choice between the majority's and the
dissent's counterfactuals as one of policy. He would not see the question of
but-for cause or "cause-in-fact" as a question of fact at all. The selection of
counterfactuals, however, should not be made on such a result-oriented
basis.
The pragmatist's error would become apparent if a super-pragmatist
trumped Justice Breyer's counterfactual. This opponent of exclusion might
grant that, if the police had not entered Hudson's premises improperly, they
would not have entered at all. Then he might claim that the police still
would have obtained the challenged evidence, for shortly after the police
abandoned their search, Hudson would have attended a religious meeting,
repented of his sins, and delivered the evidence to the police. Justice
Breyer's response to the suggestion of this counterfactual probably would
not be, "I disagree with your policy." It would be, "My goodness, that doesn't
seem likely."
Justice Breyer's counterfactual also does not seem likely. If blocked
from entering without knocking, it seems doubtful that the officers who
conducted the search in Hudson would have said, "Let's go home." More
69.
Similarly, Justice Breyer joined the opinion of the Court in Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S.
603 (1999). Without deciding the question, the Court indicated that evidence would not be
suppressed simply because the police violated the Fourth Amendment by allowingjournalists to
accompany them as they entered a home. See id. at 614 n.2 ("Even though such actions might
violate the Fourth Amendment, if the police are lawfully present, the violation of the Fourth
Amendment is the presence of the media and not the presence of the police in the home.").

Again, it would have been easy to say that although the police could have entered lawfully, they
did not; that their unlawful behavior in bringing along the journalists inseparably characterized
their entry; and that, if they had not entered, they would not have found what they found.
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probably, they would have knocked (especially because knocking posed little
risk to them-it would not have been required if it did). The appropriate
counterfactual in judging but-for causation varies the existing world as little
as possible while still altering the circumstance whose effect is at issue-in
this case, the officers' violation of the Fourth Amendment.70 The
appropriate counterfactual in Hudson is not a world in which the South won
the war or professional police forces never existed. When one asks which
counterfactual is "maximally consistent" with the actual world, the majority
in Hudson was correct. The Fourth Amendment violation was not a but-for
71
cause of the police seizure.
On occasion, officers blocked from violating rules concerning how they
must conduct a search might abandon the search in the way Justice Breyer
implied the officers would have in Hudson. For example, in United States v.
Alverez-Tejeda, federal agents had probable cause to search an automobile for
drugs, but because their undercover investigation was continuing, they did
not want the owner of the vehicle to know that they had seized it. 72 They
therefore created a minor traffic accident involving the automobile and
then staged its theft as the owner was filling out paperwork pertaining to the
accident. A federal district court held this method of seizure unreasonable
and suppressed drugs found in the vehicle. 73 In this case, if the police had

70.
See Peter Menzies, Counterfactual Theories of Causation, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring 2008 ed.), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/spr2008/entries/causation-counterfactual (describing the work of David Lewis):
The central notion of a possible world semantics for counterfactuals is a relation of
comparative similarity between worlds. One world is said to be closer to actuality
than another if the first resembles the actual world more than the second does....
[T] he relation of similarity produces a weak ordering of worlds so that any two
worlds can be ordered with respect to their closeness to the actual world, with
allowance being made for ties in closeness.
Id. (citation and emphasis omitted). For elegant criticism of David Lewis's view of causation and
the view offered here, see Michael Moore, For What Must We Pay? Causation and Counterfactual
Baselines, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1181 (2003). This Article is not the place to examine Moore's
view that the law should ask about counterfactual baselines without pretending that they
describe or define causal relationships.
71.
Such precision in statements of but-for causation is often unnecessary. When Mrs.
Peacock shoots Colonel Mustard and Colonel Mustard falls dead, one is likely to say that Mrs.
Peacock's act of shooting was a but-for cause of Colonel Mustard's death. The evidence might
show, however, that if Mrs. Peacock had not killed Colonel Mustard with the gun in the parlor,
she would have dispatched him with the poison in the kitchen. This possibility is unimportant
when the issue is Mrs. Peacock's responsibility for Colonel Mustard's death. A researcher
interested in how many lives effective gun control might save, however, could not appropriately
say that Mrs. Peacock's act of shootingwas a but-for cause of Colonel Mustard's death.
Perhaps the researcher could say that the act of shooting was a but-for cause of death
if the poisoning would have happened later. See the discussion of whether accelerating a result
should be regarded as causing the result in infra Part VI.E.
72.

United States v. Alverez-Tejeda, 491 F.3d 1013, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2007).

73.

Id. at 1016.
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been unable to seize the automobile clandestinely, they might not have
seized it at all. 74 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit made the question of but-for
75
causation academic by approving the unusual mode of seizure.
Conducting a search in an improper manner can be a but-for cause of the
seizure of evidence both when it enables the police to find evidence that
they otherwise could not have found and when the police would not have
searched at all if they could not have searched improperly. Except when
taking law school examinations, however, one is unlikely to encounter either
situation.
LaFave repeats a phrase initially used by Judge Sam Ervin III that
summarizes the majority's causal analysis in Hudson: "[I]f we hadn't done it
wrong, we would have done it right."76 This paraphrase captures something
troublesome about the Hudson decision, but when "doing it right" is the
counterfactual maximally consistent with the actual world-when the police
would indeed have done it right if they had not done it wrong-their
violation of the Fourth Amendment is not a but-for cause of their discovery.
The arresting paraphrase suggests a good reason for relaxing or abandoning
the requirement of but-for causation but not for distorting it.
III. HUDSONS SECOND GROUND OF DECISION: THE INTERESTS SERVED
BY THE KNOCK-AND-ANNOUNCE REQUIREMENT WOULD NOT

BE ADVANCED BY SUPPRESSION

If officers with a warrant to search for an elephant broke into a dwelling
unlawfully and discovered someone putting cocaine in a drawer, their
violation of the Fourth Amendment would be a but-for cause of their seizure
of the cocaine. Nevertheless, the Hudson majority apparently would not
order the cocaine suppressed. The Court declared suppression
inappropriate "when, even given a direct causal connection, the interest
protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not
77
be served by suppression of the evidence obtained."
74.
When the police have violated the Fourth Amendment, the government should bear
the burden of showing that it would have obtained the challenged evidence had the violation

not occurred. A tie-that is, a case of equally plausible counterfactuals-should go to the
defendant, just as it does when the government claims that it would inevitably have discovered
unlawfully obtained evidence through lawful means. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444
(1984) (the government must "establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means").
75. Alverez-Tejeda, 491 F.3d at 1018.
76. See 6 LAFAVE, supra note 8, at 272 (internal quotation marks omitted). Judge Ervin
used this language in United States v. Thomas, 955 F.2d 207, 210 (4th Cir. 1992).
77. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2164 (2006). To support this proposition, the
Court invoked cases declaring that causation can be too "attenuated" to justify exclusion. It said
that attenuation can occur not only when causation is remote, but also when the interests
served by a Fourth Amendment requirement do not include protecting material from the
government's scrutiny. Id. at 2165. The Court, however, had never previously used the word
attenuation to refer to anything other than the remoteness of the causal connection. It is not
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The Court wrote that the knock-and-announce requirement differed
from the requirement of a search warrant because the former was not
78
designed to "shield[] . . . potential evidence from the government's eyes."
The knock-and-announce requirement instead served three other interests:
One .

.

. is the protection of human life and limb, because an

unannounced entry may provoke violence in self-defense by the
surprised resident. Another interest is the protection of property.
.

.

.

The

knock-and-announce

rule

gives

individuals

"the

opportunity to comply with the law and to avoid the destruction of
property occasioned by a forcible entry." And thirdly, the knockand-announce rule protects those elements of privacy and dignity
that can be destroyed by a sudden entrance. It gives residents the
"opportunity to prepare themselves for" the entry of the police.
"The brief interlude between announcement and entry with a
warrant may be the opportunity that an individual has to pull on
the
clothes or get out of bed." In other words, it assures
79
opportunity to collect oneself before answering the door.
Although the Court's analysis of the interests served by specific Fourth
Amendment rules brought something new to Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence,8 0 it seemed to echo a doctrine that often has blocked
recovery in tort cases. The Restatement (Second) of Torts declares:
A statute or ordinance may be construed as intended to give
protection against a particular form of harm to a particular
interest. If so, the violation of the enactment will not be negligence
which it was
unless the harm which the violation causes is that from
81
the purpose of the enactment to protect the other.
The Supreme Court's decision in Kernan v. American Dredging Co.
illustrates this principle, although the Court ultimately declined to apply the
tort-law principle to actions brought under the Jones Act by injured
seamen.8 2 A navigation regulation required a scow to carry a white light at
least eight feet above the water. No one doubted that the purpose of the
regulation was to ensure the scow's visibility to other vessels. A scow violated
the regulation by carrying its only light no more than three feet above the
water. This open-flame light ignited vapors above the water that had been
generated by an unforeseeable spill of petroleum products, and a seaman

apparent what Hudson's requirement that suppression
Amendment interest has to do with causal remoteness.

must advance a specific Fourth

78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393 n.5 (1997)).
But see infra Part VI.C (discussing New York v. Harris,495 U.S. 14 (1990)).

81.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 286 cmt. i (1965).

82.

Kernan v. Am. Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 432 (1958).
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lost his life. A trial judge found that the fire would not have occurred if the
83
scow's light had been at the height required by the regulation.
All members of the Court agreed that "general tort doctrine" would
have barred recovery in a wrongful-death action brought by the seaman's
survivors. "The tort doctrine ... imposes liability for violation of a statutory
duty only where the injury is one which the statute was designed to
prevent."8 4 By a vote of five to four, however, the Court held this doctrine
inapplicable to Jones Act cases. It noted that in construing a similar statute it
had "rejected many of the refined distinctions necessary in common-law tort
doctrine for the purposes of allocating risks between person who are more
nearly on an equal footing as to financial capacity and ability to avoid the
hazards involved. "85
Hudson differs from cases like Kernan v. American Dredging Co. The
decedent in Kernan had not suffered the kind of injury the navigation
regulation was designed to prevent, but the defendant in Hudson was injured
in precisely the way the Fourth Amendment sought to foreclose. To be sure,
he had suffered no loss of life or limb; in his case, the police entry provoked
no shoot-out. Moreover, he had suffered no property damage; he had left
his door unlocked, and the police gained entry just by turning the knob. 6
He also had no need to get out of bed, pull on clothes, or collect himself.
Nevertheless, he lost what the Supreme Court called "those elements of
privacy and dignity that can be destroyed by a sudden entrance." 87 To put
the matter less delicately, he was terrorized when a team of police officers
burst into his home without appropriately knocking and announcing their
presence.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts declares that a defendant who has
violated a statute is not "negligent" unless the harm his violation causes is
one the statute was designed to prevent. The police, however, were negligent
or worse toward the defendant in Hudson. Hudson's discussion of "the
interest protected by the constitutional guarantee" concerned not the issue
of right addressed in the tort cases, but an issue of remedy. The Court's view
was apparently that any remedy for the violation of an interest protected by
83. One might question whether the scow's violation of the regulation was even a but-for
cause of the seaman's death. As Justice Harlan observed in dissent, the regulation did not
forbid placing a light (or a dozen lights) three feet above the water. Kernan, 355 U.S. at 442 n.1
(Harlan, J., dissenting). It merely required placing one light eight feet above the water. If the
owners of the scow had complied with the regulation, however, there probably would have been
no light three feet above the water. The issue of but-for causation turns on what would have
happened in the appropriate counterfactual world, not on what might lawfully have happened.

That the regulation was never intended to prevent the placement of lights three feet above the
water bears strongly on whether a violation of the regulation should, without more, lead to
liability for the fatal fire, but it does not bear on the issue of but-for causation.
84. Id. at 432.
85. Id. at 438.
86. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2161 (2006).
87. Id. at 2165.
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the Fourth Amendment must be limited to the restoration of that interest or
to compensation for its loss.
The view the Hudson Court took of the exclusionary rule was, in words
Abraham Lincoln used concerning a more objectionable Supreme Court
decision, "a new wonder of the world."88 For more than forty years, the
Court has denigrated "rights" theories of the rule and contended that
89
exclusion never vindicates the interests of the defendant before the court.
The Court has insisted that exclusion is always what the Hudson Court said it
never can be-a windfall awarded to a defendant for the sake of protecting
the rights of others. If, as the Court has said repeatedly, exclusion cannot
restore the defendant's violated interests and is not designed to do so,
Hudson's declaration that exclusion is inappropriate unless it restores the
defendant's violated interests is simply a formula for abolishing the rule.
What "interests" does the Fourth Amendment protect? One view might
be that the Amendment was never intended to protect the property and
privacy of guilty people, for it expressly allows intrusions upon property and
privacy when there is even probable cause to believe that a search will
uncover incriminating evidence. Certainly the Amendment was not
intended to safeguard the interest in possessing contraband. And although
Hudson declared that the search warrant requirement "shield[s]
potential evidence from the government's eyes, ''90 that statement is not
usually true. The warrant requirement shields evidence from the
government's eyes only when the police cannot establish probable cause for
a search. When the police have probable cause but do not obtain a warrant,
perhaps "the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has
been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence
obtained." 91
The requirement of but-for causation as conceived by Hudson largely
withdraws the exclusionary remedy when the police have violated a rule
concerning how a search must be conducted. There appear to be only a few
exceptions, and Hudson's additional requirement that exclusion must serve
an interest protected by the rule appears to obliterate the exceptions. 92 This

88.

CREATED EQUAL?: THE COMPLETE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES OF 1858 at 37 (Paul M.

Angle ed., 1958). Lincoln's remark concerned Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393
(1857).

89. See, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965) ("[T]he ruptured privacy of the
victims' homes and effects cannot be restored. Reparation comes too late.").
90. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165.
91. Id. at 2164; see also infra text accompanying notes 194-200.
92. Perhaps one exception remains. Suppression might still be appropriate if the police
entered without knocking and discovered an adult engaging in sex with someone below the age
of consent. The failure to knock and announce could have been a but-for cause of this
discovery, and the evidence would have been gathered by invading the adult's interest in
"collecting [himiself," "get[ting] out of bed," and "pull[ing] on clothes." See Hudson, 126 S. Ct.
at 2165.
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requirement could conceivably bar exclusion even when the police have
searched in violation of a rule telling them to stay out. The Court might
conclude that people with cocaine in their dwellings are not among the
people the probable-cause requirement was designed to protect. Hudson's
insistence that exclusion must further an interest protected by a Fourth
Amendment rule could mean almost anything.
9
IV. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ONLY A FORM OF WORDS?

3

By requiring both but-for causation and a close fit between the interest
protected by a Fourth Amendment rule and the exclusionary remedy,
Hudson appeared largely to preclude exclusion when the police have
violated rules concerning how a search must be conducted. A rights-focused
analysis of the rule supports this restriction, for the violation of a rule
concerning how a search must be conducted rarely gives the government
evidence it would not have had if it had obeyed the rule. Hudson's
requirements, however, fit far less well with instrumental justifications for
the rule. Withdrawing the exclusionary remedy when the police have
conducted a search in an improper manner leaves them with little incentive
to conduct searches in the manner the Constitution requires.
The Hudson majority, however, denied that it had left broad categories
of Fourth Amendment violations unsanctioned. Indeed, it claimed that an
instrumental analysis independently justified its ruling. As a third alternative
ground of decision, it declared, "Quite apart from the requirement of
unattenuated causation, the exclusionary rule has never been applied except
94
'where its deterrence benefits outweigh its "substantial social costs.""'
The Court averred costs that it said went even beyond "the grave
adverse consequence that exclusion of relevant incriminating evidence
always entails."95 For one thing, it said, the threat of exclusion would cause
officers "to wait longer than the law requires [before entering]i-producing
preventable violence against officers in some cases, and the destruction of
96
evidence in many others."
Although the Supreme Court had previously restricted the scope of the
97
exclusionary rule by questioning its deterrent efficacy in many contexts,

93. Justice Holmes's opinion in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392
(1920), declared that failing to exclude evidence derived from an unlawful search would
"reduce[] the Fourth Amendment to a form of words."
94. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165 (quoting Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357,
363 (1998) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984))).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2166.
97. E.g., Scott, 524 U.S. 357; Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S.
340 (1987); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984); Leon, 468 U.S. 897; United States v.
Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). ChiefJustice Burger
once called the "deterrence rationale" for the exclusionary rule "hardly more than a wistful
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the Hudson majority apparently was convinced of the rule's power. The
rule's transformation was so remarkable that it now overdeterred, inhibiting
even lawful and valuable police conduct. Presumably the Court thought civil
remedies less able to influence police behavior, for it did not suggest that
they might have the same unfortunate effect.98 As the Court recognized, it
had held that the Fourth Amendment allows officers to enter without
knocking whenever they have even a reasonable suspicion that giving notice
might lead to the destruction of evidence or to violence. 99 Having given the
police the benefit of every reasonable doubt, the Hudson majority decided
10 0
that they needed more.
Asserting (unconvincingly1 °1 ) that the legal standards in knock-andannounce cases are less certain than those governing other areas of Fourth
10 2
Amendment adjudication, the Court also warned of a "flood" of litigation.
"Courts would experience as never before the reality that '[t] he exclusionary
rule frequently requires extensive litigation to determine whether particular
evidence must be excluded.""10 3 Since 1917, however, a federal statute has
10 4
required officers to knock and announce their presence before searching,
and twice-in 1958 and 1968-the Supreme Court has ordered evidence
obtained in searches that violated this statute suppressed. 10 5 Although the
Seventh Circuit in an opinion by Judge Posner anticipated the three Hudson
holdings and refused to suppress evidence gathered in an unlawful no-knock
10 7
search, 10 6 every other federal court of appeals either rejected this position
or suppressed evidence in no-knock cases without addressing the
question.108 Like the Seventh Circuit, one state-Michigan-anticipated

dream." Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 415
(1971) (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
98. As explained in text accompanying notes 142-51 infra, the Court had it backwards.
Civil remedies are far more likely to inhibit appropriate police conduct than the exclusionary
rule.
99. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2166.
100. See The Supreme Court, 2005 Term-Leading Cases, 120 HARv. L. REv. 125, 180 (2006)
("The Court double-counted.., by first narrowing the scope of the rule and then narrowing
the scope of the remedy.").
101. See James J. Tomkovicz, Hudson v. Michigan and the Future of Fourth Amendment
Exclusion, 93 IowA L. REv. 1819, 1822-32 (2008).
102. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2166.
103. Id. (quoting Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 366 (1998)).
104. 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (2000) (original version at ch. 30, Title XI §§ 8-9, 40 Stat. 229
(1917)).
105. Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 586 (1968); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S.
301, 313-14 (1958).
106. United States v. Langford, 314 F.3d 892, 894-95 (7th Cir. 2002).
107. See United States v. Dice, 200 F.3d 978, 984-86 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Martz,
986 F.2d 1216, 1220 (8th Cir. 1993).
108. See David A. Moran, The End of the Exclusionary Rule, Among Other Things: The Roberts
Court Takes on the FourthAmendment, 2005-2006 CATO Sup. Cr. REv. 283, 284 n.3.
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Hudson,10 9 but nine states rejected the Hudson position while many others
suppressed evidence found in unlawful no-knock searches without
specifically addressing the issue.110 When lawyers throughout the United
States had been making no-knock challenges for a half century or more, the
Supreme Court's statement that a contrary ruling in Hudson would generate
suppression 1hearings "as never before" revealed a Court that had lost
1
perspective. 1
This Article maintains that the exclusionary rule works primarily by
giving courts the opportunity to articulate Fourth Amendment standards in
decisions with enough bite to be taken seriously. If this perception of the
rule's operation is accurate, Hudson's virtual elimination of litigation
concerning the validity of no-knock searches is a cost rather than a benefit.
Knock-and-announce questions arise so rarely in civil litigation that, after
Hudson, courts will almost never have occasion to address them. Hudson will
bringjudicial development of the law of no-knock searches to a halt.
The Supreme Court announced that suppression might not be justified
even if the only alternative were "no deterrence of knock-and-announce
violations at all.""' 2 It noted that the exclusionary remedy would be
unavailable if the police beat a suspect after obtaining incriminating
evidence from him and that this suspect would have only the civil remedy
3
that proponents of the exclusionary rule generally consider ineffective. '
Unlawfully breaking bones, however, would be more likely to produce a
civil recovery than unlawfully breaking a door. 1 14 The Court might better
have cited the situations in which its decisions clearly leave Fourth
Amendment violations without any redress at all. For example, judges and
prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from civil lawsuits, 115 yet the Court has
held that violations of the Fourth Amendment by these officials do not
trigger the exclusion of evidence. 1 "Qualified" immunity blocks recovery
for many violations of the Fourth Amendment by the police, 117 and when
the exclusionary remedy is unavailable for these violations (for example,
because the police failed to recover any incriminating evidence), the
violations go unsanctioned. The Framers of the Fourth Amendment would
not have applauded this state of affairs. They presumably agreed with
109. People v. Stevens, 597 N.W.2d 53, 55-56 (Mich. 1999).
110. See Moran, supra note 108, at 283 n.2 (citing the petitioner's brief in Hudson).
111. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2166 (2006).
112.
d.
113. Id. at 2166-67.
114. See infra text accompanying notes 133-37.
115. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967) (judicial immunity); Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422-23 (1976) (prosecutorial immunity).
116. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916-17 (1984) (explaining why the Court
would not exclude evidence when officials other than police officers violate the Fourth
Amendment).
117. See infra text accompanying notes 127, 169.
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Marshall that "where there is a legal right,
Blackstone and Chief Justice
118
remedy."
legal
a
also
there is
Although the Supreme Court said that suppression might not be
justified even if the result were no deterrence of knock-and-announce
violations at all, it did not acknowledge that its decision would eliminate
nearly all legal sanctions for these violations. It wrote, "As far as we know,
civil liability is an effective deterrent here,"11 9 and it added,
We cannot assume that exclusion in this context is necessary
deterrence simply because we found that it was necessary
deterrence in different contexts and long ago. That would be
of a
forcing the public today to pay for the sins and inadequacies
120
legal regime that existed almost half a century ago.
More than the Court's other pronouncements, these statements have
prompted academic concern that the Court may scrap the exclusionary rule
altogether. 121 The Court's statements certainly argue no more for
eliminating the exclusionary remedy in knock-and-announce cases than for
eliminating it in all others. Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy, who endorsed the
majority's language and who supplied the fifth vote in favor of the Hudson
ruling, declared in a concurring opinion, "f[T] he continued operation of the
exclusionary rule, as settled and defined by our precedents, is not in
doubt."'1 22 While joining an opinion for the Court that appears to contain at
least one additional holding, Kennedy declared, "Today's decision
determines only that in the specific context of the knock-and-announce
requirement, a violation is not sufficiently related to the later discovery of
evidence to justify suppression." 123
The Hudson majority noted four developments that it said had made
civil remedies more effective than they were when the Supreme Court
decided Mapp v. Ohio in 1961.124 First, during the same Term that it decided
Mapp, the Court held that a federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
1 25
authorized civil actions against state officers who violate the Constitution.
Second, the Court held a decade later that another statute, 28 U.S.C. §

118.

3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23; see Marbury v. Madison, 5 (1 Cranch)

U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (quoting 3 BLACKSTONE, supra).
119. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2167 (2006).
120. Id.
121. E.g., Moran, supra note 108, at 296 (noting that Hudson could "put the entire
exclusionary rule at risk"); The Supreme Court, 2005 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 100, at 183
("Hudson is a strong signal that the exclusionary rule is in trouble.").
122. Hudson, 126 S. Ct.at 2170 (Kennedy, J.,concurring).
123. Id.
124. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
125. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).
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1331(a), authorized similar actions against federal officers. 126 Both of these
statutes, however, leave many Fourth Amendment violations without a
remedy. The Court has held that unless the police "violate clearly
established . . . constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known," they are immune from suit.1 27 Third, the Court declared that a
1978 decision had "extended [the § 1983 remedy] to reach the deep pockets
of municipalities." 128 This decision, however, allowed recovery from
municipalities only when an officer's unlawful actions could "fairly be said to
represent official policy." 129 A later ruling held that only violations by
officials expressly given final policymaking authority by law could meet this
standard.130 Under the Court's decisions, governmental entities other than
municipalities remain immune from suit.1 3 1 Fourth, the Court noted, a
federal statute now allows civil rights plaintiffs to recover reasonable attorney
fees.

13 2

If the measures described by the Court truly had made civil remedies
for knock-and-announce violations effective, one would expect the reports
to reveal at least a few cases in which plaintiffs had recovered more than
nominal damages for knock-and-announce violations. The defendant's
lawyer in Hudson, however, could not find any; Michigan's lawyer could not
find any; the dissenting justices could not find any; and the majority could
not find any. At the same time, as the dissenting justices noted, the knockand-announce violations reported in the exclusionary-rule cases were
133

"legion."'

The lack of any reported recovery in civil lawsuits for knock-andannounce violations apparently gave the majority no pause. It wrote, "[W]e
do not know how many claims have been settled, or indeed how many

126. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
389 (1971).
127. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see alsoAnderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635 (1987).
128. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2167 (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658 (1978)).
129. MonelI 436 U.S. at 694.
130. CityofSt. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 114 (1988).
131. A 1974 amendment to the Federal Torts Claims Act, however, makes the federal
government liable for some Fourth Amendment violations by its officers. See 28 U.S.C. §
2680(h) (2000).
132. 42 U.S.C § 1988(b) (2000). Another statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (2000), limits
attorney fees to 150 percent of the plaintiffs monetary recovery when the plaintiff is a prison
inmate. Wayne LaFave notes a case in which an officer unlawfully broke an automobile window
and in which a federal district court awarded nominal damages of one dollar. The Tenth
Circuit held that, because the plaintiff was incarcerated at the time of his lawsuit, the award of
attorney fees could not exceed $1.50. 1 LAFAvE, supra note 8, § 1.2, at 4-5 (describing Robbins
v. Chronister, 435 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2006)).
133. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2175 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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134
violations occurred that produced anything more than nominal injury."
Justices who can assert the effectiveness of an invisible remedy do not lack
35
chutzpa.1
As the majority speculated, few knock-and-announce violations are
likely to produce large enough recoveries under the applicable rules of
damages to be worth the bother. 1 36 A plaintiff typically stands to recover no
more than the cost of repairing a broken door
and perhaps some
13 7
compensation for short-term emotional distress.
Although it does not seem to have happened yet, knock-and-announce
violations could occasionally lead to large damage awards. David Moran,
Hudson's counsel in the Supreme Court, found one alleged violation that
did, although the award survived only briefly. In Doran v. Eckold, police
officers received an anonymous tip that Doran was manufacturing
methamphetamine in his home. 138 The officers did not attempt to
corroborate most of the readily checked information the unknown tipster
provided-notably, that Doran's twenty-six-year-old son, who lived with him,
had recently been arrested for possessing a sawed-off shotgun. The tipster's
report of the son's arrest was false, as was his report that Doran was
manufacturing speed.
After receiving the tip, the officers searched some trash bags they found
outside Doran's home. Inside the bags, they discovered fifty plastic sandwich
bags with their corners cut out; methamphetamine residue in two of the
bags, three of the corners, and one pill bottle; and an empty Dristan box.
The officers knew that Dristan contains an ingredient useful not only in
combating nasal congestion but also in manufacturing speed. On the basis
of the anonymous tip and the evidence found in the trash bags, the officers
obtained a warrant to search Doran's home, which they entered by breaking
139
down the door without knocking.
Doran testified that he was awakened by the break-in, grabbed a pistol
from beneath his pillow, and ran to the kitchen. Realizing that the intruders

134. Id. at 2167 (majority opinion).
135. Cf Oaks, supra note 40, at 676 ("Informed observers other than the United States
Supreme Court have uniformly agreed that presently available alternatives [to the exclusionary
rule] for deterring police misconduct are ineffective.").
136.

See Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 306 (1986) (holding that

courts may not invite juries to place a value on the loss of intangible constitutional rights and
that "when § 1983 plaintiffs seek damages for violations of constitutional rights, the level of
damages is ordinarily determined according to principles derived from the common law of

torts"). In appropriate cases, however, juries may award punitive damages in § 1983 actions. See
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983).
137.

See Chatman v. Slagle, 107 F.3d 380 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that a plaintiff may

recover damages for the emotional distress inflicted by an unlawful search even when this
distress is not "severe"). In Hudson, the defendant had left his door unlocked, and the police
entered without damaging his property.
138.

Doran v. Eckold, 409 F.3d 958, 960 (8th Cir. 2005).

139.

Id. at 960-61.
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were police officers, he bent to place his pistol on the floor, but as he was
doing so, an officer shot him. The officer testified, however, that he shouted,
"Police, search warrant, get down," and fired only when Doran failed to
lower his weapon in response to this warning. Doran was hit twice and
sustained serious injuries.
Although the jury found that the force used by the officer who shot
Doran was reasonable, it awarded more than two million dollars in damages
for the allegedly unlawful no-knock entry. 140 A three-judge panel of the
Eighth Circuit upheld this verdict two-to-one, but the en banc court of
appeals set it aside. The en banc court concluded eight-to-four that the no141
knock entry was justified.

The effectiveness of civil remedies is hampered by more than a limited
measure of damages and the doctrine of qualified immunity. Most victims of
police abuse are not well advised. They lack easy access to lawyers. They may
fear reprisals. They are likely to seem unattractive to jurors. Juries prepared
to support their local police may nullify these victims' constitutional
rights.

14 2

If the current limitations of civil remedies could be corrected, the
champions of effective law enforcement would not like the result. Critics of
the exclusionary remedy observe that this remedy was unknown to the
Framers of the Constitution. 143 The remedy the Framers knew was a civil
trespass action against the offending officers-one in which the officers had
no qualified immunity and no prospect of indemnification from their
employers. 144 Restoring this sort of damage action in the name of
constitutional originalism or in the belief that sanctions are most effective
when applied directly to the individuals responsible for a violation 145 would
bring much valuable law enforcement to a halt.
Although law enforcement benefits the public, damage actions of the
kind that existed in 1791 inflict the burdens of excess and mistake on
140. Id. at 960.
141. Id. at 967.
142. See Caleb Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of IndividualRights, 39 MINN. L. REv.
493, 499-500 (1955). Successful lawsuits for civil rights violations have become far more
common than they were at the time of Foote's article, and some of the impediments Foote

noted appear to be less substantial now than they were then. Nevertheless, none of these
impediments have evaporated.
143. See Amar, supra note 45, at 786-87. Similarly unknown to the Framers were cocaine,
heroin, marijuana, helicopters, magnetometers, drug-detecting dogs, and professional police
forces.
144. See id.; Bradford P. Wilson, The FourthAmendment as More Than a Form of Words: The View
from the Founding, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING
151, 153-58 (Eugene W. Hickok,Jr. ed., 1991).
145. See Oaks, supra note 40, at 725 ("A prime defect of the exclusionary rule is that police
who have been guilty of improper behavior are not affected in their person or their pocketbook
by the application of the rule."); see also Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954) (Jackson,
J.) ("Rejection of the evidence does nothing to punish the wrongdoing official....").
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individual officers. This mismatch easily could lead officers to play it safer
than they should. As long as an action conceivably might be held illegal, an
officer faced with the prospect 46of damage liability would have little to gain
1
and much to lose by making it.

Myron Orfield once asked twenty-two Chicago narcotics officers
whether they thought a "system in which victims of improper searches could
sue police officers directly would be better than the exclusionary rule." 147 All
of the officers answered no. 148 Orfield then asked, "What would be the effect
of civil suits for damages on police work?" Twenty-one of the twenty-two
officers answered that the police would be afraid to conduct searches they
should make. 149 One high-ranking officer referred to a proposal for
increasing the effectiveness of civil remedies that Chief Justice Burger had
advanced in a dissenting opinion 150 and said, "If they ever try that one, we're
151
going to stop doing anything."
The Hudson majority declared that, like civil remedies, better police
training and "a new emphasis on internal police discipline" deters civil-rights
violations.' 52 Citing a work by Samuel Walker, it added that there had been
"wide-ranging reforms in the education, training, and supervision of police
officers." 153 Walker, however, promptly protested that the Court had missed
his point. The exclusionary rule had played a "pivotal role" in producing the
reforms he described. 54 Until Mapp, "police departments had failed to curb
misuse of authority by officers on the street while the courts took a hands-off
attitude." 155 Moreover, whatever improvements might have occurred in

146.

See The Supreme Court, 2005 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 100, at 181. Governments

today commonly indemnify officers against financial liability incurred in the course of their
employment, but when an officer's unlawful action could lead to substantial governmental
liability, he might fear that this action would lead to dismissal, transfer, or other unpleasant
personal consequences. Reformers who would substitute civil remedies for the exclusionary rule
usually intend this effect. But see Oaks, supra note 40, at 717-18 n.145 (reporting unpublished
research by William A. Briggs that found that although eighteen of thirty-five damage actions
filed against Chicago police officers in a federal district court between 1960 and 1967 resulted

in indemnification payments by the city, no officer responsible for these payments was
disciplined even by reprimand).
147. Myron W. Orfield,Jr., Comment, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence:An EmpiricalStudy
of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1016, 1053 (1987).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
422-23 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).

151.
152.

SeeAlschuler, supra note 44, at 205.
Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2168 (2006).

153.

Id.

(citing SAMUEL E. WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN

CRIMINALJUSTICE 1950-1990, at 51 (1993)).
154.

Samuel Walker, Thanks for Nothing, Nino, L.A. TIMES,June 25, 2006, at 5.

155.

Id.
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police discipline, knock-and-announce violations seem never to have led to
156
police discipline of the officers responsible for the violations.
The Court maintained that the deterrence of knock-and-announce
violations was not of great importance because the police have little
incentive to commit them:
[I]gnoring knock-and-announce can realistically be expected to
achieve absolutely nothing except the prevention of destruction of
evidence and the avoidance of life-threatening resistance by
occupants of the premises-dangers which, if there is even a
'reasonable suspicion' of their existence, suspend the knock-andannouncerequirement... ." 157

That the police might violate people's rights just for the fun of it seems
not to have occurred to the Court. Moreover, just as the Court has created
"bright line rules" that allow searches it would hold unreasonable if it
considered the facts of particular cases, 158 police officers may not pause to
consider the facts of particular cases unless judges give them a reason to do
SO.
In particular, Hudson invites the police to create de facto the bright line
159
rule that the Supreme Court refused to give them in Richardsv. Wisconsin.
The State maintained in Richards that, because a search for drugs nearly
always poses some risk of violence and of destruction of evidence, police
officers executing a warrant to search for illegal drugs should never be
required to knock and announce their presence. 160 In Richards,a unanimous
Court rejected this categorical rule 16 1 while in Hudson the Court declared
that the police have no interest in creating it.
I recently conducted a survey on the subject of when police officers
consider it useful to break in. Although my sample was small (one officer), it

156.
See Moran, supra note 108, at 320-30. Dallin Oaks observed, "[I]t is a notorious fact
that police are rarely, if ever, disciplined by their superiors merely because they have been
guilty of illegal behavior that caused evidence to be suppressed." Oaks, supranote 40, at 725-26.
But see Orfield, supra note 147, at 1046 ("[A]s a general rule in the Narcotics Section, two
suppressions in other than minor cases cause an officer's transfer or demotion."). When, under
rulings like Hudson, illegal behavior does not cause evidence to be suppressed, police discipline
becomes even less likely.
157.
Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2166.
158.
See, e.g., Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,
532 U.S. 318 (2001); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S.
692 (1981); Robinson v. United States, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). Compare Wayne R. LaFave, The
Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing "BrightLines" and "Good Faith,"43 U. PIrr. L.
REV. 307 (1982), and Wayne R. LaFave, "Case-ly-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized
Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127, with Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line
Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PIr. L. REV. 227 (1984).
159.

Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 396 (1997).

160.

Id. at 388-91

161.

Id. at 391-95.
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was larger than the sample examined by the Supreme Court. 162 Detective
Walter Smith of the Chicago Police Department, who has participated in the
execution of more than two hundred search warrants, reported that Chicago
narcotics officers rarely seek warrants authorizing no-knock entry.1 63 With
few exceptions, they knock and announce their presence even when they
believe that people inside the premises have guns and drugs. 164 Smith
suggested, moreover, that the police would knock and announce in some
cases even if no law required them to do so-for example, a case in which a
drug dealer had left a suitcase containing drugs at the home of his
unsuspecting eighty-year-old grandmother.
If freed of any legal obligation to knock, however, Smith reported that
the police would not knock often: "From the police perspective, it is almost
always safer not to."1 65 I questioned this answer, suggesting that a knock
often might reduce the likelihood of violence, but Smith rejected the idea. It
was better for the police to give notice at the same time they broke in. "As
soon as the ram hits the door, we are shouting 'POLICE, POLICE, POLICE!'
166
We may shout it one hundred times."
The principal beneficiaries of Hudson's limitation of the exclusionary
rule will be officers who violate the Constitution deliberately. Officers with
plausible reasons for making no-knock entry need no restriction of the rule,
for they do not violate the Fourth Amendment. As the Hudson majority
explained,
[A knock] is not necessary when "circumstances presen[t] a threat
of physical violence," or if there is "reason to believe that evidence
would likely be destroyed if advance notice were given," or if
knocking and announcing would be "futile" .
We require only
that police "have a reasonable suspicion . . . under the particular

162.
Only the Hudson dissenters offered any evidence on the empirical question the
majority addressed. They cited a work by Kemal Mericli for the proposition that "some '[d]rug
enforcement authorities believe that safety for the police lies in a swift, surprising entry with
overwhelming force-not in announcing their official authority."' Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2174
(Breyer,J., dissenting) (quoting Kemal A. Mericli, The Apprehension of PerilException to the Knock
and Announce Rule, 16 SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REP. 129, 130 (1989)).
163.

Telephone Interview with Walter Smith, Detective, Chi. Police Dep't (Feb. 26, 2008).

164.

The police also may attempt to gain entry by subterfuge-for example, by knocking

and pretending to be a neighbor and then exhibiting their warrant to whoever answers the
door. Just how much notice the police actually provide is open to question. When I asked
another Chicago narcotics officer whether he knocked before entering, he said, "Yes, with a wet
sponge." A high-ranking police official told Dallin Oaks that his officers "almost invariably lie
about [their conformity with] the no-knock rule . . . because it affects their personal safety."
Oaks, supranote 40, at 741 n.226.
165. Telephone Interview with Walter Smith, supra note 163.
166. Id.
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circumstances" that one of these grounds . . . exists, and we have
167
acknowledged that "this showing is not high."
When Fourth Amendment law gives the police the benefit of every
doubt, only officers acting in bad faith are likely to violate the law. The
Hudson majority underscored this fact when it noted that lower courts had
allowed "colorable knock-and-announce suits to go forward, unimpeded by
assertions of qualified immunity."' 168 As the Court had explained in an
earlier case, qualified immunity "provides ample protection to all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." 169 If, as the
Supreme Court maintained, qualified immunity poses no obstacle to suit,
the reason is that police officers are not always the nice people the Supreme
Court imagines they are. 170 In United States v. Leon, the Supreme Court
created an exception to the exclusionary rule for officers who obtain and
execute search warrants in objectively reasonable good faith. 171 Hudson adds
what might be called a subjectively unreasonable bad faith exception to the
rule.
V.

CONTRIBUTORY CAUSATION

This Article's analysis of the goals of the exclusionary rule and of the
concept of but-for causation may appear to pose a dilemma. On the one
hand, limiting exclusion to cases in which a Fourth Amendment violation
was a but-for cause of the government's discovery of evidence would allow
the police to violate many Fourth Amendment commands with impunity.
The disobedience of a rule concerning how a search must be conducted
rarely leads to the discovery of evidence that the police would not have
found if they had conducted the search properly. On the other hand,
excluding evidence whose discovery did not result from a Fourth
Amendment violation would be strange. In the absence of a causal
relationship between a Fourth Amendment violation and the challenged

167.
Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2162-63 (citations omitted). One readily understands why the
police need not risk violence or the destruction of evidence, but excusing a knock simply
because the police have a "reasonable suspicion" that knocking would be futile is mystifying.
When the police merely suspect that no one may be at home, they surely ought to knock.
168.

Id. at 2167.

169.

Malleyv. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).

170. The Hudson majority cited four decisions in support of its claim that the doctrine of
qualified immunity did not block "colorable" lawsuits. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2167. In all of these
cases, plaintiffs had alleged flagrant violations of the Fourth Amendment. See generally Green v.
Butler, 420 F.3d 689 (7th Cir. 2005); Holland ex rel. Overdorff v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179
(10th Cir. 2001); Mena v. City of Simi Valley, 226 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2000); Gould v. Davis, 165
F.3d 265 (4th Cir. 1998). The facts of these cases are in tension with the Court's view that the
police have no interest in entering without notice unless they risk violence or the destruction of

evidence.
171. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905 (1984).
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and the need
evidence, arguments about the ineffectiveness of civil remedies
72
to sanction police misconduct would simply raise eyebrows. 1
This apparent dilemma arises only because lawyers tend to think of "but
for" causation as the least demanding kind of causation the law can require.
It isn't. ' 73 Rather than ask whether the government's wrong was a sine qua
non of the discovery of challenged evidence, courts might ask whether the
government's illegal conduct facilitated the discovery of evidence either by
reducing the labor required to make this discovery or by improving the odds
of its occurrence. The concept of "contributory" cause would limit exclusion
to cases in which exclusion remedies a past violation, but unlike a
requirement of but-for cause, it would not withdraw the most important
forward-looking incentive for compliance with a broad range of Fourth
Amendment requirements. "Contributory" cause best accommodates the
dual rationales of the exclusionary rule.
Because the primary goal of the law of torts is corrective justice, 174 tort
law usually demands at least a but-for relationship between wrongdoing and
harm. But even the law of torts makes exceptions. A classic example is the
case in which two wrongdoers acting independently set fires, either of which
would be sufficient to destroy the property of a third party. When the two
fires join and destroy the property, neither wrongdoer's act is a but-for cause
of the damage, but both wrongdoers are liable for it.' 75 Moreover, in a mass
torts case in which the plaintiffs established a significant but smaller than
fifty percent chance that each defendant's wrong caused their injuries, the
California Supreme Court required each defendant to pay a proportionate
1 77
176
Indeed, as this Article will explain,
share of the plaintiffs' damages.
172.

Although

courts and commentators may disavow "rights" justifications for the

exclusionary rule, these justifications and the limiting principles they imply seem
ineradicable-part of the law's collective unconscious perhaps. Excluding evidence that bears
no causal relationship to a wrong simply to achieve instrumental goals seems almost
unthinkable.
173. The position of this Article is that any antecedent that contributes the production of a
result is a cause of the result. A specification of the way in which this antecedent must
contribute to the result is a specification of the kind of causation required.
174. Contra LANDES & POSNER, supra note 47. Sadly, the Landes and Posner view now
appears to dominate the academy.
175. See Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co., 179 N.W. 45, 49
(Minn. 1920); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2) (1965). Cases like this one are called
cases of"overdetermined" causation. I do not suggest that these cases and the others discussed
in this paragraph are comparable to Hudson and to the other exclusionary-rule cases discussed
in this Article. These cases reveal, however, that "but for" causation is not the irreducible
minimum of causal standards even in tort law.
176. See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936-38 (Cal. 1980). But see Skipworth v. Lead
Indus. Ass'n, 690 A.2d 169, 172-73 (Pa. 1997). At least one torts scholar has maintained that
negligently causing a significant risk of harm should itself be actionable. See Glen 0. Robinson,
Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for Tortious Risk, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 779, 782-83 (1985).
But see Bd. of Educ. v. A, C & S,Inc., 546 N.E.2d 580, 587 (Il1. 1989).
177.

See infra Part V].
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courts have not required Hudson-style but-for causation in civil damage
actions for unlawful searches. Recognizing that a requirement of but-for
cause can be too demanding, both Dean Green and Dean Prosser favored
instructions defining "cause in fact" as any "substantial factor" in the
production of an injury. 178 Prosser declared that this term was "sufficiently
intelligible to the layman to furnish an adequate guide in instructions to the
jury, and . . .it is neither possible nor desirable to reduce it to any lower
17 9
terms."

Canada's exclusionary rule is generally less expansive than ours. It
allows trial courts to weigh the benefits of exclusion against its costs, taking
into consideration the importance of the unlawfully obtained evidence to
the prosecution, the seriousness of the offense charged, and the gravity of
the violation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by the law
enforcement officers. 180 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Canada has
rejected any requirement of a but-for causal relationship between a violation
of the Charter and discovery of the evidence to be suppressed. Rather than
focus "narrowly on the actions most directly responsible for the discovery of
evidence," the Canadian court considers "the entire course of events leading
to its discovery." 181 A "temporal and tactical connection" between the
violation and the challenged evidence is sufficient.' 82 For example, the
denial of a suspect's right to counsel during a search may lead to the
exclusion of evidence seized during the search despite the absence of any

178.
See LEON GREEN, JUDGE ANDJURY 192 (1930); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAw OF TORTS 248 (4th ed. 1971); Leon Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60
MICH. L. REV. 543, 553-55 (1962).
179.
PROSSER, supra note 178, at 240. California jury instructions employ the "substantial
factor" formulation. Moreover, they define a substantial factor as any factor "contributing" to
the harm. At the same time, however, these instructions include a bracketed instruction
requiring but-for causation which judges may give in appropriate cases:
A substantial factor in causing harm is a factor that a reasonable person would
consider to have contributed to the harm. It must be more than a trivial or remote
factor. It does not have to be the only cause of harm.
[Conduct is not a substantial factor in causing harm if the same harm would have
occurred without that conduct.]
Judicial Council of California, California Civil Jury Instructions No. 430 (2007).
180.
See generally R. v. Burlingham, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 206 (Can.); R. v. Kokesch, [1990] 3
S.C.R. 3 (Can.); R. v. Strachan, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 980 (Can.); R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265
(Can.); Kent Roach & M.L. Friedland, BorderlineJustice: Policing in the Two Niagaras, 23 AM.J.
CRIM. L. 241 (1996).
181.
R. v. Strachan, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 980, 1002 (Can.); see also R. v. Grant, [1993] 3 S.C.R.
223, 255 (Can.) (declaring it unrealistic to sever an illegal search that might not have been
"causally linked to the evidence tendered" from "the total investigatory process which
culminated in the discovery of the impugned evidence").
182.

R. v. Grant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 223, 255 (Can.).
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183
causal relationship between the violation and discovery of the evidence.
The fact that unlawfully obtained evidence inevitably would have been
discovered in a lawful manner does not prevent exclusion, for a failure of
the police "to proceed properly when that option was open to them tends to
indicate a blatant disregard for the Charter, which is a factor supporting the
exclusion of evidence."' 8 4 As Kent Roach and M.L. Friedland observe, "A
conclusion that the police could have obtained the evidence through

from precluding exclusion . . . actually makes
constitutional means, far
5
8

exclusion more likely."1
As the next section of this Article will show, the position of the Supreme
Court of Canada is not as distinctive as it seems. Like the Canadian court,
the U.S. Supreme Court generally has not required a but-for causal
relationship between a constitutional violation and the evidence to be
excluded.
VI. CONTRIBUTORY CAUSE AND BUT-FOR CAUSE IN THE SUPREME COURT

A.

SEARCHES WITHOUT WARRANTS-WEEKS, MAPP, AND AGNELLO

The Supreme Court's 1914 decision in Weeks v. United States established
the exclusionary rule in the federal courts. 186 The violation that prompted
the exclusion of evidence in Weeks was the failure of a U.S. Marshal to secure
a warrant before searching the defendant's house and seizing his papers.
The Court's 1961 decision in Mapp v. Ohio extended the exclusionary rule to
the states. 187 In Mapp, "no search warrant was produced by the prosecution,
nor was the failure to produce one explained or accounted for."' 88 An
appendix to Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion in Hudson listed forty-one
cases in which the Supreme Court had either ordered the suppression of
evidence seized inside a home or remanded for proceedings that could lead
to the suppression of this evidence. 189 In at least twenty-five of these cases,
the alleged constitutional violation consisted simply of the failure of the
police to obtain a warrant. Although not included injustice Breyer's list, the
seized
Court also has suppressed evidence in cases in which the police
90
evidence outside a home but failed to obtain a required warrant.'
183.
SeeR. v. Strachan, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 980, 1000 (Can.). The Canadian Supreme Court has
ordered the exclusion of an incriminating statement made to a witness the day after a right-tocounsel violation "despite the fact that the statement was but remotely connected to the
unconstitttional conduct." R. v. Burlingham, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 206, 239 (Can.).
184.

R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, 285 (Can.).

185.

Roach & Friedland, supra note 180, at 346.

186.

Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).

187.

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).

188.

Id. at 645.

189.

Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2186-88 (2006) (BreyerJ., dissenting).

190. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) ("The government agents here
ignored 'the procedure of antecedentjustification... that is central to the Fourth Amendment
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In many of these cases, probable cause for the search was clear. The
police could have secured a warrant had they sought one. Nevertheless, as
the Supreme Court observed in Agnello v. United States,
The search of a private dwelling without a warrant is in itself
Belief, however well
unreasonable and abhorrent to our laws ....
founded, that an article sought is concealed in a dwelling house
furnishes no justification for a search of that place without a
notwithstanding facts
warrant. And such searches are held unlawful
19 1
unquestionably showing probable cause.
Hudson's ruling on but-for causation would require a different result in
all of the cases in which the police searched without a warrant they could
have obtained. If the police had complied with the Constitution by securing
this warrant, they would have discovered the challenged evidence, and if
blocked from searching without a warrant, they probably would have taken
Sam Ervin
the low-cost step of obtaining one. To echo the words of Judge
192
right.
it
done
have
would
they
wrong,
it
done
hadn't
III, if they
In both Hudson and the no-warrant cases, the police omitted a step that
the Constitution required them to take. In both, they would have obtained
the challenged evidence lawfully if they had taken this step. And in both,
they probably would have taken this step if blocked from taking the shortcut
they took. On the issue of but-for causation, the no-knock and no-warrant
cases are indistinguishable.
In both sorts of cases, however, contributory causation is clear. Omitting
a constitutionally required step (knocking or obtaining a warrant) made it
easier for the police to discover the challenged evidence. A contributorycause standard requires the exclusion of evidence whenever the police have
taken an illegal shortcut to its discovery. For more than ninety years, the
Supreme Court has implicitly employed this standard (or one even less
demanding 193 ) when the police have searched without the warrants the
Constitution required them to have.

' a procedure that we hold to be a constitutional precondition of the kind of electronic
....
surveillance involved in this case.") (citation omitted); see also United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1, 15-16 (1997) (search of luggage); Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1980)
(search of film canisters); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 472-73 (1971) (seizure of

an automobile).
191. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32-33 (1925); see also Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S.
30, 35 (1970) (stating that unless circumstances justify a warrantless search, it is "constitutional
error [to] admit[ I into evidence the fruits of the illegal search," even though the authorities
had probable cause).

192. See supra text accompanying note 76. To put the point somewhat differently, of the
imaginable counterfactual worlds in which the police have complied with the Constitution, the
world "maximally consistent" with the real world is one in which they have sought a warrant
before searching.
193. See infra text accompanying notes 201-08.
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The Hudson Court purported to distinguish no-warrant cases from noknock cases when it advanced a second ground of decision. Its effort to
distinguish these cases may signal its reluctance to overrule them. Should
the Court ultimately reaffirm Weeks, Mapp, and the other decisions
suppressing evidence for failure to obtain a warrant, it may note that it
expressly distinguished these cases in Hudson. If the Court adheres to
Hudson's causal analysis, however, Weeks, Mapp, and the other no-warrant
rulings are doomed. The fact that the Court regarded a second ground of
decision as inapplicable does not affect the controlling character of the first
ground.
As its second ground of decision, the Court held that the interests
served by the knock-and-announce requirement would not be advanced by
suppression. It indicated that the warrant requirement was different. Unlike
the knock-and-announce requirement, the warrant requirement was
designed to "shield[] potential evidence from the government's eyes. "194
The Court's purported distinction seems strained. The primary interest
served by the warrant requirement is keeping the police out when they don't
belong in, and this interest cannot be advanced when the police do belong
in. When the police have probable cause to search, moreover, they belong
in. A magistrate would have said so and would have given the police a paper
to prove it if only they had asked. As this Article has noted, the Court's
statement that the warrant requirement shields potential evidence from the
government's eyes is not usually true. This requirement shields evidence
from the government's eyes only when the police cannot establish probable
cause for a search.
The requirement of a warrant also serves a second interest. A warrant
gives the occupants of the premises to be searched notice "of the lawful
authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of his
power to search." 195 The purpose of the knock-and-announce requirement,
however, is also to give notice, and Hudson holds that this interest would not
be advanced by suppression. The requirement of notice is not designed to
"shield potential evidence from the government's eyes."
When the police search without a warrant, they bypass a constitutionally
required procedure for determining in advance whether the search they
propose is justified. Perhaps the warrant requirement serves a third interest
as well-that of property owners and their guests 196 in having the
194.

Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165.

195.

United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977).

196.
Some guests, that is. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90-91 (1998) (holding that
guests did not have standing to challenge an illegal search of a house). in a concurring opinion
in Cater,Justice Scalia wrote, "We went to the absolute limit of what text and tradition permit
• . .when we protected a mere overnight guest against an unreasonable search of his host's

apartment." Id. at 96 (Scalia,J., concurring).
If the police were illegally to raid one ofJustice Scalia's poker parties and seize all the
money, cards, and chips on the table, apparently only Justice Scalia would have standing to

HeinOnline -- 93 Iowa L. Rev. 1780 2007-2008

1781

THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AMD CAUSATION

government adhere to constitutionally required procedures
even when
197
adherence to these procedures would not affect the outcome.
In no-knock cases, however, the police also fail to follow constitutionally
required procedures, and unlike a failure to secure a warrant, a failure to
knock and announce usually defeats the interests this procedure was
intended to protect. People are terrified when the police invade their homes
without notice. A failure to secure a warrant when the police have probable
cause to search, however, does not defeat the primary interest the warrant
requirement was designed to protect. This failure could be regarded as
harmless error for the same reason that many trial court errors are treated as
harmless when they are reviewed on appeal. The violation can be seen in
198
retrospect not to have affected substantial rights of the defendant.
Whether or not the police have a piece of paper when they search ordinarily
makes little difference in a suspect's life-less difference than whether they
knock and announce their presence.
Searching homes and seizing property are threatening activities for
which the Constitution usually requires a license. The Constitution calls this
license a warrant. Statutes require people to obtain licenses before engaging
in other threatening activities as well-such activities as driving, practicing
medicine, and practicing law. Courts have considered whether engaging in
one of these activities without a license should lead to tort liability when an
unlicensed actor who appears to have done nothing else wrong has
produced an injury. The decisions are not uniform, but courts generally
have answered no, calling the lack of a license merely an attendant
199
circumstance rather than an effective contributing cause.
object. SeeJoan Biskupic, No Shades of Gray for Scalia, USA TODAY, Sept. 17, 2002, at IA ("Scalia

has a reputation as the life of the party. He plays poker ....

sings and is a duck hunter.").

Nevertheless, one ofJustice Scalia's guests (a fellow duck hunter perhaps) might have standing

to challenge the seizure if he had drunk too much beer and was sleeping it off in a bedroom.
Then the issue would be how long he was expected to sleep and whether Justice Scalia would
have allowed him to drive home before morning. Of course neither Justice Scalia nor his guest
would be able to secure suppression of the money, cards, and chips if the police had merely
broken in without giving notice.
197. In at least one area of constitutional adjudication, the Supreme Court has held that a
failure to adhere to required procedures entitles a litigant to relief despite the fact that
adhering to these procedures would not have benefitted him. The Court has held it immaterial
that a plaintiff challenging an affirmative action program for allocating government contracts
would not have obtained a government contract in any event. This person's "inability to
compete on an equal footing" is enough to entitle him to relief. Ne. Fla. Chapter of the
Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City ofJacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993). The rule is
different, however, when a plaintiff challenging an affirmative action program seeks damages
rather than injunctive relief. Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18, 22 (1999).
198. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) ("Anty error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not
affect substantial rights must be disregarded."); cf Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 n.4 (1984)
("The ultimate or inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule is closely related in
purpose to the harmless-error rule .... ").
199. See, e.g., Wysock v. Borchers Bros., 232 P.2d 531, 540 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951); see also
Rentschler v. Lewis, 33 S.W.3d 518, 519 (Ky. 2000) (ruling evidence of defendant's suspended
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In most of these cases, the courts have assumed that the failure to
obtain a license was a but-for cause of the plaintiffs injuries. They have
imagined a counterfactual world in which, if the defendant had complied
with the law, he would not have engaged in the activity at all, rather than a
world in which he would have obtained a license before undertaking the
activity. When obtaining a license is difficult and costly, this assumption
seems sound, and in that respect, the no-warrant cases are different. When
the police have probable cause to search, obtaining a search warrant is often
irksome but usually easy.
Despite their assumption of but-for causality, courts have ruled that the
interest served by the licensing requirement would not be advanced by
imposing tort liability. They have characterized the relevant interest as one
of preventing negligent driving or unskilled treatment and then have
concluded that the failure to obtain a license was harmless because no
negligent driving or unskilled treatment occurred. Courts might similarly
hold that the primary purpose of the warrant requirement is to prevent
searches without probable cause and that the failure to obtain a warrant is
harmless when no search without probable cause has occurred. 200
When, in retrospect, it is clear that the police officers who searched
without a warrant had probable cause for their search, courts have excluded
evidence primarily for instrumental reasons and not to vindicate the rights

license irrelevant in a negligence action); Falvey v. Hamelburg, 198 N.E.2d 400, 403 (Mass.
1964); Dean v. Leonard, 83 N.E.2d 443, 444 (Mass. 1949); Mandell v. Dodge-Freedman Poultry
Co., 45 A.2d 577, 579 (N.H. 1946) (declaring that an unlicensed driver's actions in an
emergency should be judged as though she were licensed); Brown v. Shyne, 151 N.E. 197, 199
(N.Y. 1926) (holding that a chiropractor's failure to obtain a license was not connected to a
patient's injury); The Empire Jamaica, [1957] A.C. 386, 396 (H.L.) (ruling that a ship's owners
were not liable for a boat collision although the ship's pilot was unlicensed); R.P. Davis,
Annotation, Lack of Proper Automobile Registration or Operator's License as Evidence of Operator's
Negligence, 29 A.L.R. 2D 963 (1953) ("It is generally held that the mere fact that a motor vehicle
involved in an accident on the highway is not licensed or registered has no causal relation to
the injury and is therefore immaterial, irrelevant, and incompetent to the issue of original or
contributory negligence of the operator.").
200. Indeed, in two respects, the case for finding a violation harmless seems stronger when
the police have searched without a warrant than when an unlicensed but otherwise nonnegligent medical practitioner or driver has injured someone. First, the injury produced by an
unlicensed practitioner or driver would have been regrettable even if he had been licensed.
The result produced by an unlicensed police search, however, would have been laudable if only
the police had complied with the warrant requirement. The impulse to provide a remedy even
in the absence of a clear causal relationship might therefore be less when the police have
searched without a warrant.
Second, a license provides some assurance of knowledge and skill, and its absence
provides a reason to suspect a lack of these things. When an unlicensed medical practitioner or
driver has injured someone, he might have been negligent in ways that the person injured by
his conduct cannot prove. Some state statutes create a presumption that anyone driving without
a license was driving without due care. See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 186.640 (West 2008). The
warrant requirement, however, is designed to ensure, not knowledge and skill, but the existence
of probable cause-something that often can be established with clarity after the fact.
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or interests of the defendants before them. As Justice Stevens once noted,
"[I]f probable cause dispensed with the necessity of a warrant, one would
never be needed. 20 1 The police could omit the constitutionally required
step of submitting their evidence to a magistrate and could rely on the
courts to sort things out later. Refusing to exclude evidence because the
failure to obtain a warrant did not change the outcome would leave the
police with no incentive to seek warrants in cases in which this action would
change the outcome.
The no-warrant cases reveal why consistently applying Hudson's
requirement of but-for causation would allow the police to violate
constitutional rules concerning how a search must be conducted without
significant adverse consequences. They also reveal that many of the Supreme
Court's exclusionary-rule decisions have avoided this result by not requiring
but-for causation.
Courts in fact failed to require but-for causation in civil lawsuits against
offending officers at the time of the enactment of the Fourth Amendment.
Rather than ask about the causal relationship between these officers' failure
to obtain a warrant and the injury inflicted by their search, common law
courts declared that the officers' failure to obtain a warrant made them
trespassers within the searched premises. The courts then asked whether the
officers' wrongful presence was the cause of the injury, and of course it
always was. In other words, common law courts made the same move that
Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion later made in Hudson. Justice Breyer
broadly characterized the officers' violation of the Fourth Amendment as an
202
and an officer's entry
unlawful entry rather than simply a failure to knock,
is always a but-for cause of his seizure of evidence inside.
Wilkes v. Wood, whose condemnation of general warrants inspired the
Framers of the Fourth Amendment, illustrates how common law courts
20 3
The
elided the causal issue the Supreme Court addressed in Hudson.
British Secretary of State, Lord Halifax, had issued a warrant to search for an
allegedly seditious publication, The North Briton, No. 45. As described by
Lord Chief Justice Pratt, this warrant specified "no offenders names" and
allowed "messengers to search wherever their suspicions may chance to
fall."204 Declaring the warrant "totally subversive of the liberty of the
suspect," the Lord Chief Justice encouraged a jury to take account of both
compensatory and instrumental goals and to award sizeable damages:
I have formerly delivered it as my opinion on another occasion,
and I still continue of the same mind, that a jury have it in their
power to give damages for more than the injury received. Damages

202.

Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 657 n.10 (1980) (plurality opinion).
See supra text accompanying note 65.

203.

Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498-99 (K.B.).

204.

Id. at 498.

201.
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are designed not only as a satisfaction to the injured person, but
likewise as a punishment to the guilty, to deter from any such
proceeding for the future, and as a proof of the detestation of the
jury to the action itself.

20 5

The jury that heard this charge withdrew for less than half an hour. Then it
found for the plaintiff, awarding damages of one thousand pounds. 20 6 The
2
equivalent sum today would be $244,000. 07

Note that if a court were to characterize the wrong only as failing to
obtain a warrant and then award only compensatory damages, the inability
of civil remedies to provide appropriate incentives for compliance with the
warrant requirement would be clear. The damages recoverable for a knockand-announce violation rarely exceed the cost of repairing a broken door
and compensation for brief emotional distress. If an officer with probable
cause to search had merely failed to obtain a warrant, however, the provable
compensatory damages would be zero.
Officers who entered without warrants were not the only ones the
common law regarded as trespassers. Officers who entered without knocking
were trespassers too. 208 Both were strictly liable for any harm they produced.
In no-knock cases, the courts apparently did not care that the same harm
would have occurred even if the officers had knocked. They described the
wrong not as failing to knock, but as trespass. They asked not whether the
failure to knock caused the plaintiff's injuries, but whether the trespass
caused these injuries. The trespass cases failed to require even the
contributory causal relationship between wrong and injury that this Article
has argued should determine the scope of the exclusionary rule.
Like Justice Breyer's dissent, the common law approach begged a
central question. If entering without a warrant or without knocking made an
officer a trespasser, what other violations of law would have the same effect?
Would failing to exhibit the warrant to the people inside? Would seizing an
20 9
item not named in the warrant? Would destroying property once inside?
Would bringing an unauthorized party along on the search? Would using
unnecessary force to enter after a knock had gone unanswered? The courts
205.

Id. at 498-99.

206.

Id. at 499.

207.

Two online calculators supplied this figure. See CoinMill.com-The Currency Converter,

http://coinmill.com (last visited May 13, 2008); MeasuringWorth, http://ineastiringworth.com
(last visited May 13, 2008).

208.

See, e.g., Burton v. Wilkinson, 18 Vt. 186, 189 (1846); The Case of Richard Curtis,

(1757) 168 Eng. Rep. 67, 68 (K.B.); Semayne's Case, (1603) 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B.); G.

Robert Blakey, The Rule of Announcement and Unlawful Entry, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 499, 500-08
(1964).
209.

SeeThe Six Carpenters' Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 695, 696 (K.B.) (misconduct by one

who has entered the premises of another under authority of law can taint his entry from the
beginning); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAWVOF TORTS § 25
(5th ed. 1984) (describing the "curious and unique fiction" of trespass ab initio).
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did address questions like these, and notjust in civil cases. These issues were
prominent in early decisions on the scope of the exclusionary rule.
For example, in McGuire v. United States in 1927, officers with a valid
warrant to search for and seize bootleg liquor destroyed "all the seized
liquor except one quart of whiskey and one quart of alcohol, which they
retained as evidence." 2 10 The Court held that the two quarts the officers
retained were admissible, and it said:
It is contended that the officers by destroying the seized liquor
became trespassers ab initio; that they thus lost the protection and
authority conferred upon them by the search warrant; that
therefore the seizure of the liquor, both that destroyed and that
retained as evidence, was illegal and prohibited by the Fourth
Amendment and that the reception of the liquor in evidence
violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution.
This conclusion has received some support in judicial decisions.
But the weight of authority is against it. That the destruction of the
liquor by the officers was in itself an illegal and oppressive act is
conceded. But it does not follow that the seizure of the liquor
which was retained violated constitutional immunities of the
defendant or that the evidence was improperly received. 2 1'
Justice Breyer's discussion of causation in Hudson placed him in
distinguished company. Judges had played the same word game for two-andone-half centuries.
B.

SMASHING VASES-THE DICTUM IN UNITED STATES V. RAMIREZ

A final section ofJustice Scalia's opinion in Hudson declared that "a trio
of cases" supported the Supreme Court's refusal to exclude evidence seized
after an unlawful no-knock entry. 2 12 Justice Kennedy, who had joined the
other parts of Justice Scalia's opinion, did not join this one, so this last
section of Justice Scalia's opinion was not an opinion of the Court. Justice
Kennedy declared without elaboration that he was "not convinced that [two
213
] have as much relevance here as
of the three cases cited byJustice Scalia
2 14
Justice Scalia appears to conclude."

210.

McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95, 97 (1927).

211.

Id. at 97-98 (internal citations omitted); see also On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747,

752 (1952) ("[T]he claim that [an undercover agent's] entrance was a trespass because consent
to his entry was obtained by fraud must be rejected."); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 629
(1946) ("The agents did not become trespassers ab initio when they took the check.").
212. SeeHudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2168 (2006).
213. New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990) and Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796
(1984).

214.

concurring).
Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2171 (Kennedy, J.,
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Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion, however, relied on a third case
cited by Justice Scalia, United States v. Ramirez.2 15 In Ramirez, the Court found
no Fourth Amendment violation but said in dictum, "Excessive or
unnecessary destruction of property in the course of a search may violate the
Fourth Amendment even though the' 2entry
itself is lawful and the fruits of
16
the search not subject to suppression."
Justice Breyer apparently agreed with Justice Kennedy that this dictum
offered the most plausible precedent for the result in Hudson. In dissent, he
called Ramirez the majority's "best hope." 2 17 Although Justice Breyer and the
other Hudson dissenters had joined the unanimous Ramirez opinion, he
indicated that this part of the opinion might have slipped past him and
might not have his approval. "[E]ven if I accept this dictum," he said, "the
entry here is unlawful, not lawful."218 In this statement, Justice Breyer relied
once more on his characterization of the Fourth Amendment violation in
Hudson. This violation did not consist simply of failing to knock or of
entering in an unlawful manner. The failure of the police to knock made
the entry itself unlawful. This entry was unlawful because Justice Breyer said
so, and he offered no other basis for distinguishing Ramirez.
Although Ramirez did not cite McGuire v. United States,219 the smash-themash liquor case described above, 220 what was merely dictum in Ramirez
appeared to be holding in McGuire. Although destroying property
unnecessarily during a search violates the Fourth Amendment, this violation
does not require the exclusion of evidence seized during the search. The
Hudson majority appeared to ask why, if unnecessarily breaking property
during a search does not trigger exclusion, unnecessarily breaking the front
22 1
door to get in should be different.
The concept of contributory causation supplies an answer. Consider
more fully a case of the sort discussed in Ramirez. As a group of police
officers are lawfully searching a house for cocaine, one of them notices a
vase in the living room and smashes it. He has no good reason for destroying
215. United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65 (1998).
216. Id. at 66. The Court also said that if it had found that breaking a window to enter a
garage violated the Fourth Amendment, it would have considered whether there was a
"sufficient causal relationship" between this violation and the discovery of evidence to warrant
suppression. Id. at 72 n.3. BothJustice Kennedy andJustice Scalia treated this reservation of the
issue as though it had resolved the issue at least in part. Justice Kennedy described Ramirez as
holding that "application of the exclusionary rule depends on the existence of a 'sufficient
causal relationship' between the unlawful conduct and the discovery of evidence." Hudson, 126
S. Ct. at 2171 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Scalia asked, "What clearer expression could
there be of the proposition that an impermissible manner of entry does not necessarily trigger

the exclusionary rule?" Id. at 2170 (Scalia,J.).
217.

Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2185 (BreyerJ., dissenting).

218.
219.

Id.
McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95 (1927).

220.
221.

See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
See Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2170.
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this property. The officer does not find cocaine in the vase, but he and the
other officers later find cocaine in the bedroom. The Ramirez dictum and
the McGuire holding indicate that the cocaine found in the bedroom will not
be suppressed.
This conclusion seems sound-and not because a court whose judges
skipped breakfast has decided that it would rather not call the vase-smashing
officer a trespasser ab initio. It is sound because there was no causal
relationship between smashing the vase in the living room and seizing the
drugs in the bedroom. If the police were to search a house illegally one day
and another house legally the next, a court would not suppress drugs found
in the second house. The lack of a causal relationship would be decisive, and
the lack of a causal relationship similarlyjustifies the dictum in Ramirez.
The case would be different if the officer had found cocaine inside the
vase itself. Even in that case, destroying the vase might not have been a butfor cause of the seizure. If the officer had not smashed the vase, he might
have turned it over and found the drugs lawfully. Breaking the vase was,
however, a contributory cause of the discovery. It made finding the drugs
easier. The officer took an illegal shortcut to the discovery of this evidence.
Hudson is much the same. Unlike breaking a vase in the living room,
breaking the front door made discovering drugs in the bedroom easier, or at
least the police believed that it did. Illegally smashing a vase in the living
room before finding drugs in a bedroom resembles illegally searching one
house before finding drugs in another, but illegally smashing a door before
finding drugs inside a house has more in common with smashing a vase and
finding drugs inside the vase.
As the "vase case" illustrates, a requirement of contributory causation
would leave some Fourth Amendment violations without a remedy. Omitting
a mandatory step-taking a shortcut-would require the suppression of
evidence, but taking an unlawful extra step might not. Even smashing a
person in the living room would not require suppression of the cocaine
found in the bedroom unless the unlawfully beaten person was standing in
the officer's way (like the door in Hudson) or unless he responded by
222
revealing the location of the drugs.
As this Article has noted, it may not make sense from an instrumental
perspective to require a causal relationship between wrongdoing and harm.
Discouraging the police from smashing a person in the living room is surely
as worthwhile a goal as inhibiting them from breaking in.
Moreover, some judicial approaches to causal issues would allow the
suppression of the cocaine seized in the "vase case." A common law judge
222. Note that a standard of but-for causation would not require the suppression of the
drgs found in the bedroom even if the suspect beaten in the living room had told the police
where they were. Because a lawful search for the drugs was underway, the drugs "inevitably"
would have been discovered. A standard of contributory causation, however, would require

suppression of the drugs.
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might announce that, by smashing the vase, the offending officer became a
trespasser ab initio. Or, respecting the ruling in McGuire, this judge might
declare that although smashing a vase does not make someone a trespasser
ab initio, smashing a person does because it is very, very bad. Justice Breyer
might declare that, although the officers who smashed the vase could have
searched lawfully, they did not, and if the officers had not searched at all,
they would not have discovered the cocaine. The Supreme Court of Canada
might find a sufficient "temporal and tactical connection" between smashing
the vase and the later discovery of cocaine to warrant suppression. The
Canadian court, however, might use its generally discretionary approach to
suppression to distinguish on other grounds a smashed-vase case from a
smashed-person case.
Unlike some of these other approaches, a contributory-causation
standard requires at least a minimal "rights" justification for suppression in
every case. The police must have wronged the person seeking suppression,
and their wrong must either have made the seizure from this person more
likely or reduced the work required to make it. Moreover, this standard
supplies a principle of decision and depends less on gestalt responses to
particular circumstances. A contributory-cause standard also rationalizes
most of the Supreme Court's decisions in exclusionary-rule cases. For
example, it distinguishes the Ramirez dictum from the Court's many no223
warrant cases and its no-knock rulings prior to Hudson.
C. ARRESTS WITHOUT WARRANTS-NEW YORK V. HARRIS
In United States v. Watson, the Supreme Court held that a police officer
need not obtain an arrest warrant before arresting a suspected felon in a
public place. 224 In Payton v. New York, the Court held that an officer
ordinarily must obtain an arrest warrant before entering a dwelling to make
a felony arrest. 225 The defendant in New York v. Harris,another of the trio of
cases on which Justice Scalia relied in Hudson,2 26 was arrested in his home
without a warrant in violation of Payton.227 After his arrest, he made an

223.
Recall that, prior to Hudson, the Supreme Court had twice suppressed evidence
because officers failed to knock and announce before entering. See Sabbath v. United States,
391 U.S. 585, 591 (1968); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 314 (1958). These cases had
relied, not on the Constitution, but on a federal statute imposing a knock-and-announce
requirement identical to the one the Court later discovered in the Constitution. See Sabbath, 391
U.S. at 388; Miller, 357 U.S. at 313. There is no apparent reason why the same right should lead
to different remedies simply because it appears in one form of law rather than another. None of
the Hudson Court's arguments against exclusion rested on its reluctance to impose a federally
crafted remedy on the states. Miller and Sabbath appear to have been overruled sub silentio by
Hudson.
224.

United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1976).

225.

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980).

226.

See Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2168.

227.

New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 15 (1990).
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incriminating statement inside his home and then another incriminating
statement at the station house. The defendant contended that both of these
statements should be suppressed as the product of his unlawful arrest.
In Harris, the State did not challenge the trial judge's ruling that the
defendant's first statement-the one made inside his home-should be
excluded. Early in its opinion, the Supreme Court declared, "The sole issue
in this case is whether Harris' second statement-the written statement
made at the station house-should have been suppressed .... 228 As it
neared the end of its opinion, however, the Supreme Court went beyond the
"sole" issue that the case presented and approved suppression of the
initial
statement: "[A]nything incriminating the police gathered from arresting
Harris in his home .. .has been excluded, as it should have been."229 Holding
the defendant's second statement admissible, the Court explained, "Even
though we decline to suppress statements made outside the home following
a Payton violation, the principal incentive to obey Payton still obtains: the
police know that a warrantless entry will lead to the suppression of any
230
evidence found, or statements taken, inside the home."
The Court sought to justify admission of the second statement by
speaking of counterfactual conditionals. When the police violate Payton
by making a warrantless arrest inside a home, one can envision three
counterfactual scenarios in which they could have complied with the
Constitution. First, they might not have arrested the defendant at all;
second, they might have obtained a warrant prior to his arrest; and third,
they might have arrested the defendant without a warrant in a public place.
For no apparent reason, the Court chose the third counterfactual. It
wrote that "Harris' statement taken at the police station was not... the fruit
of having been arrested in the home rather than someplace else." 23 1 And
again: "[T]he statement, while the product of an arrest and being in
custody, was not the fruit of the fact that the arrest was made in the house
232
rather than someplace else."
The Court's analysis failed to distinguish the defendant's two statements
from one another. If the police had arrested the defendant in a public place
without a warrant, they probably would have obtained both of these
statements. Although the dissenting Justices in Harrisdeclared that someone
arrested unlawfully inside the home "is likely to be so frightened and rattled
that he will say something incriminating," 233 the dissent's attribution of
extremely different psychological effects to an arrest in a home and an arrest
elsewhere seemed strained. Though one can never be sure in a
228.

Id. at 16.

229.

Id. at 20 (emphasis added).

230.

Id.

231.

Id.at 19.

232.

Harris,495 U.S. at 20.
Id. at 28 (Marshall,J., dissenting).

233.
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counterfactual world, the best judgment is that, if the police had arrested
the defendant in a public place, they would have obtained both of his
statements.
Neither of the other counterfactuals would have made the Court's
distinction between the defendant's first statement and his second more
plausible. If the police had complied with the Constitution by not arresting
the defendant, they would have obtained neither of his statements, and if
they had complied by obtaining a warrant prior to his arrest, they would
have obtained both.23 4 Although the Court purported to ask whether each
of the defendant's statements was the "product" or "fruit" of his unlawful
arrest, it did not engage in a bona fide causal analysis. Instead, it supplied a
pragmatic split-the-difference resolution of the case-admitting one piece of
evidence and excluding the other in the belief that a fifty-percent solution
would provide "sufficient" deterrence.
The Court's instrumental analysis was dubious. It maintained that "the
principal incentive to obey Payton still obtains: the police know that a
warrantless entry will lead to the suppression of any evidence found, or
statements taken, inside the home. "235 When a person under arrest has
made a statement inside his home, however, persuading him to repeat this
statement someplace else is rarely difficult. In Justice Jackson's often quoted
words, "[A] fter an accused has once let the cat out of the bag by confessing,
he is never thereafter free of the psychological and practical
disadvantages of having confessed. He can never get the cat back in the bag.
The secret is out for good."23 6 And once someone has confirmed outside his
home what he said inside, the admissibility of what he said inside barely
matters.

23 7

234. For this reason, it is immaterial whether, if blocked from making an unlawful
warrantless arrest inside the suspect's home, the police would have secured an arrest warrant or
instead would have arrested the defendant in a public place without one. If they had taken
either course, they probably would have obtained both of the defendant's statements lawfully,
and a Hudson-style analysis would therefore admit both statements. A requirement of but-for
causation would require exclusion only if the officers blocked from making an unlawful arrest
would have given up and gone home.
235. Harris,495 U.S. at 20.
236. United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540 (1947) (Jackson,J.).
237. The Court's fifty-percent solution has created odd incentives and required artificial
line-drawing. Harris turns the admissibility not only of statements but also of tangible evidence
seized following a Payton violation on whether the evidence is seized inside or outside the home.
It thereby provides an incentive for officers to delay a search of the suspect's person until they
have removed him from his dwelling. Of course, officers must balance the evidentiary
advantage of such a delayed search incident to arrest against the risk it would pose to their
safety. They are unlikely to use this gambit often.
Like Payton, Harris requires courts to determine whether the police made arrests and
obtained evidence inside or outside a home. Post-Harrislitigation therefore has focused on
determining the home's boundary. Pre-Harris law declared that although officers could lawfully
trespass on "open fields" without probable cause or a search warrant, their entry into the
"curtilage" of a dwelling house required both. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301
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The Supreme Court's refusal to exclude the second statement of the
suspect in Harris-his stationhouse statement-cannot be squared with the
standard of contributory causation advocated by this Article. In Harris,the
Constitution required the police either to obtain a warrant for the suspect's
arrest or to wait until he left his dwelling before arresting him. By doing
neither, the police made their acquisition of the second statement easier
than it should have been. Moreover, no intervening cause other than the
officers' delivery of the Mirandawarnings and the suspect's own decision to
confess "dissipated the taint" of the unlawful warrantless arrest, and the
Supreme Court earlier had held those events insufficient to break the causal
chain.

238

Although half of Harriscannot be squared with a contributory-causation
standard, the other half cannot be squared with Hudson. Unlike Hudson,
Harrisdid not withdraw the exclusionary remedy altogether from a broad
class of Fourth Amendment violations. Even after Harris, a Payton violation
could have evidentiary consequences. Courts still had occasion to develop
the law of the Fourth Amendment and give guidance to the police.
Moreover, the Harris and Hudson standards of causation are
irreconcilable. If the police in Harrishad been blocked from arresting the
(1987) (requiring courts to consider the proximity of an area to the dwelling, whether the area
is enclosed, how the area is used, and what steps have been taken to preserve the area's
privacy); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177-78 (1984); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S.
57, 59 (1924). Some courts have concluded that the Payton-Harrisline is the same and that a
statement made outside a dwelling but within its curtilage must be suppressed. See, e.g., State v.
Santiago, 602 A.2d 40, 44 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992) (suppressing statements made on a porch);
State v. Smith, 767 So. 2d 1, 1-2 (La. 2000) (suppressing statements made in a backyard). Most
courts, however, have drawn the line at the "threshold" of a dwelling. See, e.g., Stevens v. State,
691 N.E.2d 412, 23-24 (Ind. 1997) (refusing to suppress statements made on a driveway). Their
approach raises nice questions about garages. See, e.g., United States v. Oaxaca, 233 F.3d 1154,
1156-58 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding an arrest in garage invalid because the police lacked a
warrant).
Drawing the line at the "threshold" has generated frequent litigation about arrests and
statements made near the front door and about police stratagems to draw suspects to or beyond
their doorsteps. In the absence of an arrest warrant, reaching inside a door to pull a suspect
onto the porch violates Payton. No part of an officer's body may intrude into a home without a
warrant. McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231, 1241-48 (11th Cir. 2007). Contra 1 LAFAVE, supra
note 42, § 6.1(e), at 303 ("[A] de minimus breaking of the vertical plane above the threshold
should not itself make the warrantless arrest unlawful; otherwise the legality of doorway arrests
would have to be determined by resort to plumb bob and quaint distinctions drawn from the
'entry' ingredient of common law burglary."). Ordering a suspect onto the porch, however,
presents a close case. On the one hand, the order restrains the suspect's liberty and appears to
affect an arrest while he is still inside. On the other, the officer does not enterwithout a warrant.
See id. at 301-02 (describing a split of authority on whether the decisive location is that of the
arresting officer or that of the arrestee). Luring a suspect onto the porch is permissible unless
the methods used to do so render the suspect's presence on the porch involuntary. People v.
Fernandez, 599 N.Y.S.2d 405, 408-10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993). Like other pragmatic, forwardlooking, ethically incoherent decisions, Harrishas spawned a mass of unpragmatic litigation.
238.
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 605 (1975); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
486-87 (1963).
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defendant in his home without a warrant, they probably would not have
abandoned the effort to arrest him. They would instead have obtained a
warrant or else would have arrested him somewhere else. If they had done
either, they would have obtained both of his statements lawfully. (If they
hadn't done it wrong, they would have done it right.) Hudson's standard of
but-for causation thus would have dictated admission of the statement whose
exclusion Harris approved. The trio of decisions that Justice Scalia cited in
support of Hudson included one decision flatly incompatible with Hudson's
requirement of but-for causation.
D. ENTERING Too SooN, PART I-SEGURA

V. UNITED STATES

In Segura v. United States, the third case ofJustice Scalia's trilogy, federal
agents had probable cause to search an apartment for drugs and to arrest
two people who lived there.2 39 When they described their evidence to a
federal prosecutor at 6:30 p.m., he told them that it was probably too late in
the day to secure a search warrant. The prosecutor nevertheless authorized
240
the agents to make their arrests and secure the apartment immediately.
The agents staked out the apartment building of the suspects and
arrested one of them as he entered the building. They then entered the
suspects' apartment without consent and discovered four people inside.
After a brief "sweep" of the premises, which revealed drug paraphernalia,
the agents arrested these four people. One of them later
proved to be the
24 1
other resident of the apartment whom the agents sought.
Two of the agents remained in the apartment while the others
transported and booked the people under arrest and sought a search
warrant. The two agents remained in the apartment for eighteen to twenty
hours until a magistrate issued the warrant. Then they searched the
apartment, discovering drugs and other incriminating evidence. 242 The
magistrate who issued the warrant based his determination of probable
cause on evidence gathered prior to the agents' entry of the apartment; he
243
did not know what they had seen inside.
In the Supreme Court, the government did not challenge lower court
rulings that the evidence the agents had observed before the magistrate
approved the search warrant must be suppressed. The question before the
Court was whether the evidence discovered after the warrant issued should
be excluded as well. 244 The Supreme Court held this evidence admissible by
a vote of five to four.

239.

Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984).

240.

Id. at 800.

241.

Id. at 800-01.

242,

Id. at 801.

243

ld. at 814.

244.

Segura, 468 U.S. at 804.
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Crucial to the majority's analysis was its determination that the agents
could lawfully have "secured" the apartment without a warrant throughout
the entire period it took to obtain a warrant. 245 Just what the agents could
have done to guard against the destruction of evidence inside the
apartment, however, was unclear. Only Chief Justice Burger spoke for the
majority, and one lengthy section of what was otherwise his opinion for the
Court was joined only byJustice O'Connor.
In this section-the heart of his opinion-the Chief Justice contended,
first, that the agents had properly entered and swept the apartment and
removed its occupants and, second, that the agents had lawfully deprived the
apartment's occupants of their "possessory interest" in the premises. 246 If the
agents had violated the Fourth Amendment at all, they had done so only by
remaining inside the apartment after removing the occupants.2 47 At that
point, they could have secured the apartment from the outside by guarding
the door. According to the Chief Justice, that course would have been
"arguably wiser." 248 By remaining inside, the agents intruded upon a "privacy
interest" of the occupants as well as their possessory interest. 249 Any
improper intrusion upon the occupants' privacy interest, however, had been
fully remedied by excluding what the agents saw prior to their search
pursuant to the warrant.
The remaining Justices in the majority appeared reluctant to approve
the agents' initial entry into the apartment. The portion of Chief Justice
Burger's opinion that qualified as an opinion of the Court spoke only of
guarding the apartment from the outside: "Had the police never entered the
apartment, but instead conducted a perimeter stakeout to prevent anyone
from entering the apartment and destroying evidence, the contraband now
challenged would have been discovered and seized precisely as it was here.
The legality of the initial entry is, thus, wholly irrelevant ....250
One can readily agree that securing the apartment in the way Chief
Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor approved-sweeping the apartment,
removing its occupants, and then guarding the door from the outsidewould have been as effective as securing it in the way the agents didsweeping the apartment, removing its occupants, and then guarding the
premises from the inside.
It is more difficult to believe that the technique approved by the other
three majority Justices would have been as effective as the technique the
agents actually used-or that it would have been effective at all. The agents
had lawfully arrested one resident of the apartment and would hold him
245.

Id.

246.

Id. at 810.

247.

Id.at 811.

248.

Id.

249.

Segura, 468 U.S. at 811.

250.

Id. at 814.
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overnight. If the second resident had suspected his arrest (or if she had
noticed a law enforcement officer outside her door), she might well have
cleared the apartment of its contraband. It is difficult to secure a dwelling
while leaving an unarrested co-conspirator inside the dwelling free to flush.
If, in Segura, the agents' unlawful entry and occupation of the
apartment prevented destruction of the evidence they later seized, their
unlawful entry and occupation were a but-for cause of their seizure. Hudson
presumably would require suppression of this evidence. Hudson asks whether
the agents would have obtained the challenged evidence if they had obeyed
the law; if obeying the law would have led to destruction of the evidence, this
evidence could not have been seized. 251 All of the majority Justices in Segura
assumed that some lawful police action would have prevented the
destruction of evidence.
A contributory-causation standard, however, asks a question less
forgiving of police misconduct. It asks whether a violation of the law
facilitated seizure of the challenged evidence. In effect, this question
changes the percentages. If the agents' unlawful act reduced the chance that
evidence would be destroyed from forty percent to twenty percent, the
causal relationship between the act and the seizure would be sufficient to
require suppression. That the agents probably would have obtained the
evidence even if they had obeyed the Constitution would not be decisive if
they had unlawfully tilted the odds in their favor.
When an unlawful act has not facilitated a seizure-when it has not
changed the odds in favor of the police or reduced their labor at all-even
contributory causation is lacking. If one assumes in Segura that securing the
apartment in a lawful manner would have been fully as effective as securing
it in the way the agents did, the ruling in Segura seems sound. The entry and
occupation of the apartment would then have been unlawful acts without
causal significance (like smashing a vase just for the joy of it while
conducting a search).25 2 Although Segura anticipated Hudson by declaring a
but-for causal relationship between a Fourth Amendment violation and

251.
If obeying the law in a case like Segura would have led to destruction of the evidence,
something seems wrong with the law. Law enforcement officers with probable cause to search
should be allowed to secure occupied premises effectively while they seek a search warrant, but
that is a subject for another article.
252.
One should hesitate to conclude that unlawful acts by the police were without causal
significance. When the police have violated the Constitution, doubtful issues should be resolved
against them. A court should begin with the assumption that law enforcement officers did what
they did because they believed it would help to produce the results they produced. A court
should also presume that this belief was accurate. Cf Segura, 468 U.S. at 836 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("The agents impounded this apartment precisely because they wished to avoid
risking a loss of access to the evidence within it.").
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discovery of the challenged evidence essential, 253 even the decision in Segura
is arguably consistent with a contributory-causation standard.
E.

ENTERING Too SooN, PART II-MURRAYV. UNITED STATES

In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court held that
the Constitution requires the exclusion not only of unlawfully seized
"primary" evidence but also of evidence "derived" from this evidence254_
what the Court later called "fruit of the poisonous tree." 255 Justice Holmes's
opinion for the Court declared, "The essence of a provision forbidding the
acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so
acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at
all." 25 6 Holmes's opinion then created what has come to be known as the
independent source exception to the exclusionary rule: "Of course this does
not mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible. If
knowledge of them is gained from an independent source they may be
"257
proved like any others ....
A standard of contributory causation would not disturb the
independent source exception. When evidence has an independent source,
there is no causal relationship of any kind between this evidence and an
258
earlier constitutional violation.
In Silverthorne Lumber Co., for example, after unlawfully seized papers
were returned to their owner, a prosecutor who had gained knowledge of
the papers through their improper seizure issued a subpoena directing the
owner to produce them before a grand jury. 259 The Supreme Court held this
maneuver impermissible. It declared that the exclusionary rule does not
"mean only that two steps are required instead of one." 260
The result evidently would have been different, however, if a prosecutor
without unlawfully obtained knowledge had subpoenaed the papers in the
course of an independent investigation. Then the earlier unlawful seizure
would not have contributed to discovery of the papers in any way. Similarly,
if unlawful wiretapping enabled the police to overhear a conversation and if
one of the parties to this conversation then approached the police without
prompting to describe this conversation, this participant's testimony would

253.
Segura, 468 U.S. at 815 (majority opinion) ("[O]ur cases make clear that evidence will
not be excluded as 'fruit' unless the illegality is at least the 'but for' cause of the discovery of the
evidence.");see supra note 19.
254.

Silverthore Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 389 (1920).

255.

See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).

256.

Silverthorne Lumber Co., 251 U.S. at 392.

257.

Id.

258. The absence of a causal relationship between one source and another is what it means
to call the second source independent.
259.

SilverthorneLumber Co., 251 U.S. at 392.

260.

Id.
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be admissible. The unlawful wiretapping would have been neither a but-for
nor a contributory cause of his testimony.
In Segura v. United States, the early-entry case discussed in the preceding
section, 26 1 the Supreme Court assumed that all evidence the federal agents
had observed between the time of their unlawful entry and the time they
executed a valid warrant was properly suppressed.262 In Murray v. United
States, however, the Court held that this evidence should not have been
suppressed. The Court relied on the independent source doctrine to justify
this conclusion.

263

In Murray, federal agents lawfully searched two vehicles and discovered
marijuana. They previously had seen two suspects drive these vehicles into a
warehouse and then, twenty minutes later, drive them out. As the suspects
drove from the warehouse, the agents observed within it "two individuals
and a tractor-trailer rig bearing a long, dark container."264 These and other
circumstances established probable cause to search the warehouse, but after
successfully searching the vehicles, the agents did not immediately seek a
search warrant for the warehouse. Instead, they forced their way in.
Although the agents did not find anyone inside, they observed "numerous
265
burlap-wrapped bales that were later found to contain marijuana."
The agents then left the warehouse without disturbing the bales and
sought a search warrant. "In applying for the warrant, the agents did not
mention the prior entry, and did not rely on any observations made during
that entry." 266 After the warrant issued, the agents searched the warehouse
267
and seized 270 bales of marijuana.
The Supreme Court assumed that the agents had violated the Fourth
Amendment by entering the warehouse without a warrant. The Court
recognized that if "information gained from the illegal entry [had] affected
either the law enforcement officers' decision to seek a warrant or the
magistrate's decision to grant it," the search pursuant to the warrant would
have been unlawful. 268 The Court concluded, however, that the officers
would have sought a warrant even if they had not entered unlawfully and
that the magistrate would have granted it. 269 On these assumptions, the
Court held that the search pursuant to the warrant had an independent
source. 270 On the Court's view of the facts, the agents' initial entry of the

261.

Supra Part VI.D.

262.

Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 796-97 (1984).

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988).
Id. at 535.
Id.
Id. at 535-36.
Id. at 536.
Murray,487 U.S. at 540.
Id.
at 541.
Id. at 542.
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seizure would have
warehouse was not a but-for cause of their seizure. The
271
occurred even if the agents had not entered too soon.
Whether the initial entry was a contributory cause of the seizure is a
more difficult issue. Immediately entering the warehouse without a warrant
might appear to be an unlawful shortcut to the seizure of evidence. Yet if the
agents had not broken in but instead had sought the warrant that they later
did seek, they would have seized the marijuana sooner, not later, and they
would have seized it with less work, not more. Entering the warehouse
apparently broke the law, but perhaps, like smashing a vase in the living
room, it did not help at all. As things turned out, it was merely a gratuitous
extra step.
One might hesitate to reach this conclusion for two reasons. For one
thing, although the break-in delayed the agents' seizure of the marijuana, it
The law sometimes regards
accelerated their discovery of this evidence.
272
hastening a result as causing the result.
Homicide law offers a clear illustration of the fact that acceleration can
be everything. Proving that someone other than the defendant would have
killed the victim a moment or two after he did (or that the victim was about
to die of natural causes) does not save the defendant from conviction. Every
homicide consists of hastening a death that was certain to occur anyway. It is
sufficient that, but for the defendant's act, the result would not have
occurred when it did. That the actor shortened life by a moment establishes
that he caused a death.2 73
If the causal principles applicable to exclusionary-rule decisions were no
different from those applied in homicide cases, the Court would have
misapplied the concept of but-for causation in Murray. The agents would not
have discovered the marijuana when they did but for their unlawful entry.
Hudson also would have misapplied the concept of but-for causation. By
failing adequately to knock and announce their presence, the officers
hastened their seizure of the defendant's drugs by at least a few moments.
And the Court would have misapplied the concept of but-for causation in
Nix v. Williams, which this Article will discuss in its next section. 274 In Nix, an
271.

Id. at 543.

272.

In Murray, although the break-in did not hasten the seizure, it did hasten the search.

273. In a memorable hypothetical case, Actor A pushes the victim from the top of the
Empire State Building, and Actor B fatally shoots him as he passes the twenty-fifth floor. Actor B
is guilty of murder, but Actor A is guilty only of attempted murder. SeeJEROME HALL, GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 262 (1st ed. 1947) (presenting a similar hypothetical case); see also
State v. Matthews, 38 La. Ann. 795, 796 (La. 1886) (When one actor mortally wounded a victim
and another then struck him with a bottle, the second actor was "deemed guilty of the
homicide, though the person beaten would have died of other causes ....); cf Dillon v. Twin
State Gas & Elec. Co., 163 A. 111, 114-15 (N.H. 1932) (holding that when someone falling to
his death grabs a live wire and is electrocuted, a defendant who negligently maintained the wire
is liable to the victim's survivors, though the victim's short life expectancy due to the fall bears
upon what damages the defendant must pay).
274. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984); infra Part VI.F.
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unlawful interrogation in the absence of the defendant's counsel
275
accelerated the discovery of a murder victim's body by three to five hours,
but the Court held that the interrogation was not a but-for cause of the
2 6
discovery. 7

In Murray, Hudson, and Nix, however, the precise moment when the
officers discovered the incriminating evidence was, within limits, a matter of
indifference. Although courts in homicide prosecutions treat every moment
of life as valuable, 277 a comparable presumption would seem extravagant in
search and seizure cases. The failure to give appropriate notice in Hudson
was not wrongful because it enabled the police to seize evidence a few
moments earlier than they otherwise would have. And just as an act that
accelerates the discovery of evidence should not be regarded as a but-for
cause of the discovery, it should not be regarded as a contributory cause of
the discovery unless, for one reason or another, the timing of the discovery
did matter. 278 A standard of contributory causation asks whether a Fourth
Amendment violation facilitated a search or seizure. Acceleration without
more does not meet this standard.
The dissenting Justices in Murray suggested a second reason why the
agents' illegal entry might have had causal significance. Justice Marshall
wrote that the relevant question was whether the agents would have sought a
warrant if their initial warrantless search of the warehouse had failed
to reveal incriminating evidence. 279 Marshall was concerned that
law enforcement officers might conduct illegal searches to confirm
their suspicions of criminal activity before seeking warrants. "[M]any
'confirmatory' searches," he wrote, "will result in the discovery that no
evidence is present, thus saving the police the time and trouble of getting a
warrant." 280 The Court's application of the independent source doctrine
removed any disincentive to employing this two-search strategy. According
to Justice Marshall, it empowered officers to search first, get a warrant
281
second, and then seize.
The majority responded that its ruling did effectively discourage use of
the two-search strategy. Officers who searched unlawfully before seeking a
warrant would be required to show that nothing they had observed during
their search had influenced either their own decision to seek a warrant or

275.

Nix, 467 U.S. at 449.

276. Id. at 449-50.
277. See Commonwealth v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356, 360 (1816) (declaring that there is "no
period of life which is not precious as a season of repentance").
278. As it would have, for example, in Segura if the unlawful entry had prevented the
destruction of the evidence and preserved it for seizure.
279.

Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 547 n.2 (Marshall,J., dissenting).-

280.

Id. at 547.

281.

Id.
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the magistrate's decision to grant it. 2 82 The majority then offered two
further responses to Justice Marshall's argument, both of which bore on
causal issues.
Justice Scalia's opinion for the majority maintained, first, that Justice
Marshall's counterfactual was inapposite. The issue was not whether the
agents would have abandoned their plan to seek a warrant if their initial
search had come up dry. It was whether they would have sought a warrant if
they had never entered the warehouse at all:
Justice Marshall argues that "the relevant question [is] whether,
even if the initial entry uncovered no evidence, the officers would
return immediately with a warrant to conduct a second search." We
do not see how this is "relevant" at all. To determine whether the
warrant was independent of the illegal entry, one must ask whether
it would have been sought even if what actually happened had not
occurred-not whether it would have been sought if something
else had happened. That is to say, what counts is whether the actual
illegal search had any effect in producing the warrant, not whether
283
some hypothetical illegal search would have aborted the warrant.
Justice Scalia posed the correct counterfactual question for resolving an
issue of but-for causation: If the Fourth Amendment violation had not
occurred, would the agents still have obtained the challenged evidence?
Justice Marshall's counterfactual, however, bore on a different causal
question: Did the agents' violation of the Fourth Amendment make it easier
for them to obtain evidence?
The agents' unlawful entry would have been an unproductive extra step
in Murray itself even if the agents had deliberately employed a two-search
strategy. Over the course of a number of investigations, however, this
strategy would have eased the agents' burdens by saving them the trouble of
seeking warrants when their confirmatory searches failed to confirm. An
expansive contributory-causation standard might ask whether the unlawful
actions of the police in the case before the court would ease their path to
the discovery of evidence generally. Unlike a standard that focused on causal
effect in the case at hand, this modified standard would serve only
instrumental goals. Its purpose would be to vindicate the rights of people
other than the defendant in the case before the court. A court that adopted
this standard, however, would askJustice Marshall's counterfactual question.
The majority's final response to Justice Marshall's argument was that
there was no reason to suspect the use of a two-search strategy in Murray
itself:
282. Id. at 540 (majority opinion). For a forceful response to this portion of the majority's
analysis, see Craig M. Bradley, Murray v. United States: The Bell Tolls for the Search Warrant
Requirement, 64 IND. L.J. 907, 916-20 (1989).

283.

Murray, 487 U.S. at 542 n.3 (citation omitted).
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[T] here is no basis for pointing to the present cases as an example
of a "search first, warrant later" mentality. The District Court found
that the agents entered the warehouse "in an effort to apprehend
any participants who might have remained inside and to guard
against the destruction of possibly critical evidence." ... While they
may have misjudged the existence of sufficient exigent
circumstances to justify the warrantless entry ....

there is nothing

to suggest that they went in merely to see if there was anything
28 4
worth getting a warrant for.
This passage indicated that Justice Scalia and the other Justices in the
majority might have ordered the evidence in Murray suppressed if the agents
had been shown to have used a "search first, warrant later" strategy.
Suppression in such a case, however, would be inconsistent with the
requirement of but-for causation that Justice Scalia later articulated in
Hudson. Hudson would ask whether, if the agents had not violated the Fourth
Amendment by entering too soon, they would nevertheless have obtained
the challenged evidence, and in Murray they would have. Agents whose
investigation had developed the evidence the agents in Murray possessed
surely would have sought and obtained a warrant and would have seized the
marijuana lawfully. The agents' reasons for entering too soon-whether to
prevent the destruction of evidence or to save themselves the trouble of
obtaining a warrant if their initial search came up dry-would not matter.
Although Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Murray hinted that the use
of a "search first, warrant later" strategy would not go unsanctioned, his later
opinion for the Court in Hudson would make even a confession of this
misconduct irrelevant.
F.

INEVITABLE DISCOVERY-NIXV. WILLIAMS

The independent source doctrine admits only lawfully obtained
evidence. The government must show that its source was untainted by prior
illegal acts. In Nix v. Williams, however, the Supreme Court approved a
doctrine that often admits unlawfully obtained evidence. 285 The Court called
this doctrine the "hypothetical independent source" or "inevitable
286
discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule.
1. On a Dark Day in Iowa
Williams, a habeas corpus petitioner, escaped from a mental hospital
and killed a ten-year-old girl, Pamela Powers. 28 7 He agreed to surrender to

284.
285.
286.
287.

Id. at 540 n.2.
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
See id. at 438.
Id. at 452.
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the authorities, who agreed not to question him as they transported him to
the county in which the killing occurred. z 8
After he surrendered, Williams appeared in court on a murder charge.
His appearance triggered his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and made
any interrogation in the absence of his counsel unlawful. Nevertheless, as
Detective Learning and another officer drove Williams across Iowa, Detective
Learning gave him "something to think about":
They are predicting several inches of snow for tonight, and I feel
that you yourself are the only person that knows where this little
girl's body is... [1] f you get a snow on top of it you yourself may be
unable to find it ....

I feel that we could stop and locate the body,

that the parents of this little girl should be entitled to a Christian
burial for the little girl who was snatched away from them on
Christmas [Eve] and murdered .... [After] a snow storm [we may
not be] able to find it at all. z89
Williams considered this speech for a time and then led the police to the
90
2

victim's body.

Williams's case produced two Supreme Court decisions. Seven years
before Nix, in Brewer v. Williams, the Supreme Court held that both
Williams's statements indicating guilt and the fact that he brought the police
to the body must be excluded as the product of Detective Leaming's
violation of his right to counsel. 29 1 The issue in Nix was whether evidence of
the condition of the body itself should be suppressed.
The Supreme Court held that, because the body inevitably would have
been discovered in a lawful manner, it need not be suppressed. Before
Detective Leaming delivered his Christian burial speech, the Iowa Bureau of
Criminal Investigation had begun a search for the body. Two hundred
volunteers were proceeding westward in a pattern that eventually would have
292
brought it to light.
Before this Article turns to the Supreme Court's approval of the
inevitable discovery exception, it considers two possible alternative paths to
the Court's result in Nix. The Court might have held that, in the absence of
flagrant police misconduct, the exclusionary rule is inapplicable to
prosecutions for serious crimes of violence. Or it might have held that
interrogating a suspect in violation of his right to counsel requires the
suppression only of primary and not derivative evidence.

288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

Id. at 435.
Id. at 435-36.
Nix, 467 U.S. at 436.
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
Nix, 467 U.S. at 448.
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Suppressing Bodies

Justice Powell once wrote of the exclusionary rule, "The disparity in
particular cases between the error committed by the police officer and the
windfall afforded a guilty defendant by application of the rule is contrary to
the idea of proportionality that is essential to the concept ofjustice." 293 Even
a zealous champion of the rule in other contexts might hesitate to apply it
when the evidence a killer seeks to suppress is the body of his victim and
when the government's only wrong consists of reminding this killer in the
absence of a lawyer that the body was exposed to the elements.
In Nix, the Supreme Court emphasized what Williams sought to
suppress. 294 It recited Justice Cardozo's concern in 1926 that "some court
might press the exclusionary rule to the outer limits of its logic-or
beyond-and suppress evidence relating to the 'body of a murdered' victim
295
because of the means by which it was found."
This Article has observed that, in evaluating the exclusionary rule, it is
necessary to weigh incongruities. 296 My own view, like that of the late John
Kaplan, is that the escape of drug dealers and gamblers is a lesser evil than
the use of unlawfully obtained evidence but that the escape of murderers,
spies, armed robbers, and kidnappers is not.297 I have noted, moreover, that
"[a]lthough no judge has formally approved Kaplan's proposal, nearly all
judges reportedly recognize a de facto exception to the exclusionary rule
when the evidence a defendant seeks to suppress is a body." 298
Strained application of the inevitable discovery doctrine has been a
frequent means of implementing this de facto exception. For example, the
Kentucky Supreme Court once declared that "the victim's body inevitably
would have been discovered [inside the killer's apartment], especially as the
odor of decomposition increased." 299 It rejected the suggestion that the
killer might have moved the body with the remark that "there is no
'constitutional right" to destroy evidence."'3 00 The Kentucky court was
unwilling to recognize that a criminal might do something wrong. Perhaps,
in Kentucky, the inevitable discovery exception makes all incriminating
evidence admissible because criminals have no constitutional right to
conceal it. A few courts, however, have ordered the bodies of murder victims

293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
n.339.
299.
300.

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976).
Nix, 467 U.S. at 446-47.
Id. at 448 (quoting People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 588 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.)).
See supra Part I.A.
SeeJohn Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1048 (1974).
Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Profilingand the Constitution,2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 163, 258
Hughes v. Commonwealth, 87 S.W.3d 850, 852 (Ky. 2002).
Id. at 853; see also State v. Beede, 406 A.2d 125 (N.H. 1979); State v. Sugar, 527 A.3d

1377 (N.J. 1987).
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suppressed, as the Eighth Circuit did in Nix.3 0 1 John Kaplan's proposed
limitation of the exclusionary rule might have offered an attractive
30 2
alternative path to the result the Supreme Court reached in this case.
3.

Yes, We Have No Tree Fruit

Supreme Court decisions since Nix have marked a less attractive path to
this result. These decisions have held that violations of the rules articulated
in Miranda v. Arizona30 3 for interrogating suspects require the suppression
only of primary evidence and not of secondary fruit. When the statement of
a suspect interrogated in violation of Mirandareveals the location of a gun,
for example, the gun is admissible. 30 4 An improper two-step interrogation
(questioning a suspect in violation of Miranda, securing his confession, and
then inducing him to repeat his confession after a warning of his rights) can
result in exclusion of the second confession-but only when the Miranda
violation was deliberate, when the purpose of this violation was to produce
an admissible second confession, and when the police failed to take
appropriate "curative measures."30 5 In such a case, exclusion apparently rests
on the failure of the police to warn the suspect "effectively" before obtaining
his second confession, not on the fact that the second confession was a
30 6
product of their initial failure to warn.
The Supreme Court has distinguished violations of the "Fifth
Amendment" right to counsel created by Miranda from violations of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel created by the Bill of Rights. 30 7 The
Court treats violations of the Sixth Amendment as violations of the "real"
Constitution, while it appears to treat violations of the Fifth Amendment
right as violations of the 'just pretend" Constitution. 30 8 If the petitioner in
Nix v. Williams had not appeared before a magistrate, Detective Leaming's
301.
Nix v. Williams, 700 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 467 U.S. 431 (1984); see also
Mitchell v. State, 742 S.W.2d 895 (Ark. 1988).
302.
The principal argument against Kaplan's proposal is that it would greatly reduce the
incentive to obey the Fourth Amendment in the cases in which the temptation to violate the
Fourth Amendment is strongest. Moreover, even people who favor Kaplan's proposed
exception may believe that it should remain de facto. Although courts almost never suppress
the bodies of murder victims, perhaps law-enforcement officers should remain concerned that
they might. Like much of the substantive criminal law, the exclusionary rule may bark harder
than it wants to bite. See generally Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic
Separation in CriminalLaw, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984).
303.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

304.

See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004).
305.
See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 622 (2004). In Seibert, Justice Kennedy supplied
the decisive fifth vote for excluding the second confession, and a two-step interrogation
apparently will lead to exclusion only when the conditions set forth in his concurring opinion
are satisfied. See id. at 622.
306.
307.

See id.; Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 300 (1985).
See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1967).

308.

See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 424-25 (1986).
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interrogation would have violated only his Fifth Amendment right to
counsel. Today, if a violation of the Fifth Amendment right led the police to
the body of a murder victim, the Supreme Court would admit the body
whether or not a search had begun and whether or not the body would
inevitably have been discovered.
Whether secondary evidence derived from an interrogation in violation
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel should be admitted now appears
to be an open question. The Supreme Court remanded a case presenting
this issue to the Eighth Circuit, which declined to distinguish violations of
the Sixth Amendment from violations of Miranda and admitted the
30 9
derivative evidence.
As time passes and causal forces other than a wrongful act by the police
contribute to the discovery of evidence, a court may appropriately declare
the "taint" of the wrongful act "dissipated" and may admit the evidence
despite the fact that the wrongful act was a but-for or a contributory cause of
its discovery. 310 Drawing a sharp line between "primary" and "derivative"
evidence and excluding only the former, however, cannot be justified in the
administration of any exclusionary rule, whether this rule is grounded in the
real Constitution or the whimsy of ChiefJustice Warren. Refusing to exclude
derivative evidence does not reflect a bona fide application of causal
principles but merely limits the exclusionary rule by fiat.
As Justice Holmes noted in Silverthorne Lumber Co., there may be no
distinction at all between the first use of unlawfully obtained evidence and
the second. 11 If an unlawfully interrogated suspect were to write out a
confession, excluding this written confession while admitting a photocopy of
it would be nonsensical, and admitting a second confession while excluding
the first sometimes has much in common with admitting a photocopy.
Although the Supreme Court has seemed to treat the exclusion of derivative
evidence as a dubious extension of the exclusionary rule, the exclusion of
312
this evidence is often essential to the rule's coherent operation.
4.

Inevitable Discovery and Causation

The inevitable-discovery doctrine determines the scope of the
exclusionary rule by applying the principle of but-for causation, and in Nix,
the Supreme Court embraced this principle wholeheartedly. It maintained
that the rule was designed to place the government in neither a better nor a

309.

United States v. Fellers, 397 F.3d 1090, 1095 (8th Cir. 2005).

310.

See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963).

311.

See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).

312.
If the petitioner in Nix had said nothing to Detective Leaming but instead had led him
to the victim's body and pointed, would the body have been primary or derivative evidence?
Should anyone care?
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worse position than it would have occupied if no Fourth Amendment
violation had occurred.3 13
When Nix was before the Iowa Supreme Court and later the Eighth
Circuit, both courts approved the inevitable discovery exception with a
significant limitation. This exception would not apply if the police had
"act[ed] in bad faith for the purpose of hastening discovery of the [evidence
in question]." 314 The Supreme Court rejected this limitation with the

remark that it "would put the police in a worse position than they would have
been in if no unlawful conduct had transpired."3 15 The Court called the
lower courts' limitation of the inevitable discovery exception "formalistic,
3 16
pointless, and punitive."
The Court also held that an "inevitable" discovery need not be
inevitable. It would be enough for the prosecution to "establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably
would have been discovered by lawful means."317 To say that evidence
probably would inevitably have been discovered is gibberish, but one can
guess what the Supreme Court meant. The hypothesized lawful discovery
need not be certain or inevitable at all; it need only be probable.
Both Nix and the inevitable discovery exception are incompatible with
the contributory-causation standard favored by this Article. Detective
Leaming took an illegal shortcut to the discovery of evidence. His violation
of the Sixth Amendment made discovering the victim's body easier.
Although the government might well have discovered this evidence within
several hours if Leaming had obeyed the Constitution, his violation of the
Constitution changed the odds and made discovery of the body more
certain.
The inevitable discovery exception is likely to sound good to anyone
who assumes that causation always means at least but-for causation. When a
violation of the Constitution is not a but-for cause of the discovery of
313.

Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984).

314.
State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248, 260 (Iowa 1979); accord Williams v. Nix, 700 F.2d
1164, 1169 (8th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). The courts disagreed about whether
Detective Learning had acted in bad faith for the purpose of hastening discovery of the body.
The Iowa Supreme Court said he hadn't, and the Eighth Circuit said he had. See id. at 1170
(declaring that the Iowa Supreme Court's finding was "'not fairly supported by the record"').
Detective Leaming probably was not doing what the Eighth Circuit said he did. He was
not acting in bad faith to hasten an inevitable discovery. Instead, he was acting unlawfully to
ensure a discovery that he feared might not occur at all. Leaming might even have believed that
Williams was the only person who knew where the body was and that, after a snowstorm, neither
Williams nor the police would be able to find it. Whether or not he believed that the search led
by the Iowa Bureau of Criminal Investigation probably would reveal the location of Pamela
Powers's body, he was acting unlawfully to better the odds. Acting to improve the odds would
satisfy a requirement of contributory causation but not a requirement of but-for causation.
315.
Nix, 467 U.S. at 445.
316.

Id.

317.

Id. at 444.
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evidence, why suppress it? Upon discovering where this exception leads,
however, one may hesitate and seek limitations. Most courts and nearly all
commentators have done so.
5.

Inevitable Discovery When the Police Have Searched
Without Warrants or Without Knocking

In both Segura and Murray, the police seized the challenged evidence
only after obtaining valid warrants not based on their earlier unlawful
observations.3 18 In United States v. Griffin, the police also obtained a valid
warrant not based on any illegal observation, but the case was slightly
different. Police officers seized evidence shortly before one of their fellow
319
officers obtained a valid warrant.
In Griffin, narcotics agents had probable cause to search an apartment.
One of them was sent to obtain a search warrant and the others to secure
the apartment. The agents dispatched to secure the apartment, however,
broke in and seized drugs without awaiting the warrant. The other agent
320
arrived with the warrant four hours later.
The difference between Segura and Murray, on the one hand, and
Griffin, on the other, is the difference between the independent source and
the inevitable discovery exceptions to the exclusionary rule. This difference
may seem thin. If a magistrate was certain to issue a valid warrant on the
basis of lawfully obtained evidence, why would anyone care whether he
issued it a moment before or a moment after a search occurred? Unlike a
requirement of contributory causation, a requirement of but-for causation
leads to both the independent source exception and the inevitable discovery
exception. Someone who envisions the issue in exclusionary-rule cases as
one of but-for causation may have difficulty telling the two doctrines apart.
Yet refusing to sanction a warrantless search whenever it seemed
inevitable that, had it not occurred, the police would have obtained a valid
warrant would mean the end of the warrant requirement. Police officers who
had probable cause to search but who searched without a warrant could
almost always assert convincingly that, if they had not searched illegally, they
would have obtained a warrant and discovered the same evidence. 32 1 And if
a warrant issued a moment after a warrantless seizure could prevent
exclusion, why not one issued a week or a month later? The Sixth Circuit
excluded what the impatient agents seized in Griffin, stating that "police who
believe they have probable cause to search cannot enter a home without a
warrant merely because they plan subsequently to get one ....

318.

See supraPart VI.D-E.

319.

United States v. Griffin, 502 F.2d 959, 960 (6th Cir. 1974).

320.

Id.

321.

See supra text accompanying notes 191-200.
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view would tend in actual practice to emasculate the search warrant
322
requirement of the Fourth Amendment."
The Sixth Circuit's argument was convincing, yet no discovery could
have been more inevitable than the one in Griffin. If the police had not
jumped the gun, they soon would have obtained the challenged evidence
lawfully. In Griffin, one can say with confidence that the wrongful act of the
police was not a but-for cause of their discovery. The Sixth Circuit backed
away from the concept of but-for causation, however, because it recognized
the unfortunate instrumental consequences of applying it.323 With the
notable exception of the Seventh Circuit (whose position is described in the
following paragraphs), so have most other courts when the police have
seized evidence without a warrant that the Fourth Amendment required
24
them to have.

3

The Seventh Circuit has applied the inevitable discovery doctrine to
evidence gathered by unlawful warrantless searches in several cases, the most
recent of which is United States v. Tejada 5 After arresting a narcotics suspect
in an apartment, federal agents forced him to the kitchen floor and
handcuffed him. Then they searched without a warrant an "entertainment
center" in another room. After upholding this search as a lawful incident of
the suspect's arrest(!), the court held in the alternative that the inevitable
discovery doctrine applied. Even if searching the entertainment center
without a warrant had been unlawful, the agents inevitably would have
searched it with a warrant because they had clear probable cause to get one.
Judge Posner's opinion for the court recognized that applying the
inevitable discovery doctrine whenever the police had probable cause to

326
obtain a warrant would leave them with no incentive to obtain warrants.

The opinion observed, however, that failing to apply the doctrine "would
confer a windfall, in violation of 'the familiar rule of tort law,' which has
force in the criminal context as well

. .

. 'that a person can't complain about

a violation of his rights if the same injury would have occurred even if they
had been violated.'- 3 27Judge Posner then concluded, "An attractive middle
322.

Griffin, 502 F.2d at 961.

323.

Id.

324.
1 LAFAVE, supra note 42, at 270 n.77 (citing cases from the Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits and from numerous state courts).
325.
United States v. Tejada, 524 F.3d 809 (7th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Goins,
437 F.3d 644, 650 (7th Cir. 2006) (declaring it permissible to open a gun case without a warrant
because the police had probable cause and inevitably would have obtained a warrant); United
States v. Buchanan, 910 F.2d 1571, 1573 (7th Cir. 1990) (upholding a warrantless search of a
suspect's clothing because the police inevitably would have sought and secured a warrant to
search the hotel room in which the clothing was located); cf. United States v. Souza, 223 F.3d
1197, 1204-05 (10th Cir. 2000) (declaring that, although the failure to obtain a warrant is
usually fatal, the inevitable discovery exception sometimes allows the receipt of evidence
obtained through an unlawful warrantless seizure).
326.

Tjada, 524 F.3d at 813.

327.

Id. (citation omitted).
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ground is to require the government, if it wants to use the doctrine of
inevitable discovery to excuse its failure to have obtained a search warrant,
and not merely probably, have been
to prove that a warrant would certainly,
328
issued had it been applied for."
The court's position is indeed a middle ground. On the one hand, it is
flatly inconsistent with the Supreme Court's statement in Nix that the
government need only "establish by a preponderanceof the evidence that the
information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful
means."3 29 On the other hand, it is flatly inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's statement in Agnello that evidence seized without a warrant must be
suppressed "notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause."330
The Seventh Circuit's position thus underscores the incompatibility of the
inevitable discovery doctrine (also known as the requirement of but-for
33 1
causation) and the Court's traditional treatment of warrantless searches.
The court's "attractive middle ground" fell short of solving the problem
the court noted. The Supreme Court has said that probable cause exists
whenever there is "a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found in a particular place." 332 Tejada removes the incentive to seek
warrants only when (this is a mouthful) there is "certainly and not merely
probably" a fair probability that evidence will be found. If a "fair probability"
that evidence will be found in a particular case is a twenty percent chance, a
certainty that a fair probability exists is also a twenty percent chance.33 3 It
seems odd that a pragmatic, forward-looking, economically minded judge
would disapprove a position providing334appropriate incentives for the police
simply to avoid conferring "windfalls."
Although courts other than the Seventh Circuit have proclaimed that
the inevitable discovery exception should not be allowed to emasculate the
warrant requirement, none have explained why a violation of this
requirement differs from other violations of the Fourth Amendment. The
328.

Id.

329.
330.

Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 445 (1984) (emphasis added).
Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32-33 (1925) (emphasis added).

331. The Supreme Court in Nix apparently was oblivious to the fact that its decision would
launch a virus capable of killing Weeks, Mapp, and Agnello. The Court may have assumed without
reflection that the inevitable discovery doctrine was compatible with those decisions. Nix can be
.reconciled" with Agnello, however, only through the move the Sixth Circuit made in Griffindeclaring that, despite its logic, the inevitable-discovery doctrine is simply inapplicable to cases
in which the police have violated the Fourth Amendment by failing to obtain a warrant.
332. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
333. Or, perhaps, in practice it is a thirty percent chance because "certainty" demands a
margin of error. In that event, Tejada leaves the police with no incentive to seek warrants when
they believe they have a thirty percent chance that they will find what they are looking for.
334. The concluding paragraph of Tejada hints that the court's ruling may be limited to
cases in which the police fail to obtain warrants before searching containers and particular
pieces of furniture. It may not apply when they enter houses without warrants. Tejada, 524 F.3d
at 813.
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33
inevitable discovery exception subverts almost all legal obligations equally. 5
The Michigan Supreme Court, for example, relied on this exception when it
336
withdrew the exclusionary remedy from knock-and-announce violations.
Most other courts, however, rejected Michigan's position for the same
reasons that Griffin rejected the government's effort to apply the inevitable
3 37
discovery exception to warrantless seizures.
Although the Hudson Court spoke of but-for causation rather than
inevitable discovery, the two formulations are clones. They pose the same
question and give the same answers. To say that the police would have
obtained the challenged evidence even if they had not violated the
Constitution is to say both that this evidence inevitably would have been
discovered lawfully and that the constitutional violation was not a but-for
cause of its discovery.

6.

Even the Good Guys Get It Wrong: Professor LaFave
andJustice Breyer on Inevitable Discovery

Although Wayne LaFave disapproves of the ruling in Hudson,
he considers Hudson's statement of the need for but-for causality
"unassailable."3 38 Someone who truly favored a standard of but-for causation
could not consistently support any limitation of the inevitable discovery
doctrine, however, and LaFave does. Every limitation of this doctrine-for
example, Griffin's limitation when the police have seized evidence without a
warrant-excludes evidence that the police would have obtained even if they
had not violated the Constitution.
LaFave writes:
The concerns expressed by the opponents of the "inevitable
discovery" rule are legitimate and ought not be dismissed out of
hand. A careful assessment of their arguments, however, indicates
that they are directed not so much to the rule itself as to its
application in a loose and unthinking fashion ....
In carving out
the "inevitable discovery" exception . . . , courts must use a
3 39
surgeon's scalpel and not a meat axe.

LaFave then maintains that "the inevitable discovery doctrine should not be
utilized . . . to paper over instances in which the police have engaged in

unconstitutional shortcuts." 340 The inevitable discovery doctrine, however,
never does anything else. Detective Leaming took an unconstitutional
335.
The sole exception is the requirement of probable cause (and it is only sometimes an
exception). The inevitable discovery doctrine comes close to telling the police that, once they

have probable cause, anything goes. They can ignore all the other rules.
336.

People v. Stevens, 597 N.W.2d 53, 62 (Mich. 1999).

337.
338.
339.

See supra text accompanying note 110.
6 LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 11.4(a), at 27.
1 id. § 11.4(a), at 269 (4th ed. 2004).

340.

6 id. § 11.4, at 29.
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shortcut to the discovery of the victim's body in Nix, and the police take an
unconstitutional shortcut whenever they seize evidence illegally that they
would have obtained lawfully in the absence of their improper seizure.
LaFave also declares "that the 'inevitable discovery' rule simply is
inapplicable in those situations where its use would, as a practical matter,
operate to nullify important Fourth Amendment safeguards." 341 How nice it
would be to believe it. If this statement were true, not much would be left of
the exception.
In his dissenting opinion in Hudson, Justice Breyer wrote that the
argument of Michigan's counsel "misunderstands the inevitable discovery
doctrine."3 42 He explained that "'independent' or 'inevitable' discovery
refers to discovery that did occur or that would have occurred (1) despite
(not simply in the absence oj) the unlawful behavior and (2) independently of
that unlawful behavior." 343 Arguing that the discovery in Hudson was not
independent, Justice Breyer repeated his claim that the unlawful behavior
consisted not of failing to knock but of entering unlawfully. 344 He declared
once more that if the police had not entered they would not have found the
3 45

drugs.

Justice Breyer's statement that "'independent' or 'inevitable' discovery
refers to discovery that did occur or that would have occurred despite (not
simply in the absence oj) the unlawful behavior" appears to miss the
distinction between independent and inevitable discovery. Justice Breyer
seemed to treat these concepts as indivisible.
As this Article has indicated, the difference between the two doctrines is
subtle but important. If, in Nix, Detective Learning had photographed the
victim's body and left it in place, a search party unaware of his unlawful
action might have discovered the body despite his violation. In other words, it
might have discovered the body independently. If it had, a court could have
suppressed Detective Leaming's photographs while admitting the testimony
and photographs of the search party. Detective Leaming's violation of
Williams's rights would not have been a contributory cause of the evidence
actually presented.
If, however, Detective Learning had discovered the body illegally and
taken it to the morgue, the search party no longer could have discovered it
despite his violation (or independently). The inevitable discovery exception,
however, might still apply. The issue would be whether the search party
would have found the body where Williams left it if Detective Leaming had
not removed it-in other words, whether they would have found the body in
the absence of his violation. If Learning had removed the body, his unlawful
341.

1 id. § 11.4(a), at 271-72 (4th ed. 2004).

342.

Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2178 (2006) (BreyerJ., dissenting).

343.

Id.

344.

Id. at 2177.

345.

Id. at 2179.
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actions would have been a contributory cause (though perhaps not a but-for
cause) of the government's possession of the body. Perhaps the dissenting
Justices' insistence that discovery must occur despite, and not simply in the
absence of a constitutional violation indicated that they approved only the
independent source doctrine and not the inevitable discovery doctrine. It
was the dissenters and not Michigan's counsel, however, who misunderstood
the inevitable discovery doctrine. They made it sound less threatening to
Fourth Amendment rights than it is.
7.

The Active-Pursuit Limitation

A substantial number of courts have held that the inevitable discovery
doctrine applies only when the challenged evidence would have been
discovered by an investigation already underway at the time of the
constitutional violation. An equal number, however, have rejected this
limitation.3 46 The dissenters in Hudson appeared to endorse what
347
commentators call the "active-pursuit" limitation.
LaFave apparently considers the active-pursuit limitation too narrow.
He favors use of the inevitable discovery doctrine in active-pursuit cases and
at least one other category of cases as well:
Circumstances justifying application of the 'inevitable discovery'
rule are most likely to be present if these investigative procedures
were already in progress prior to the discovery via illegal means...
or where the circumstances are such that, pursuant to some
standardized procedures or established routine a certain evidence3 48
revealing event would definitely have occurred later.
LaFave's co-authored casebook describes as "relatively easy cases" those in
which "the evidence discovered through an illegal warrantless search would
have been discovered in an inventory search."349
Courts have focused on the active-pursuit limitation because it is
consistent with the facts of Nix, because, unlike the good-faith caveat, it was
not foreclosed by the Nix opinion; and because the concurring and
dissenting justices in Nix who sought to describe the majority's holding

346. See Stephen E. Hessler, Note, Establishing Inevitability Without Active Pursuit:Defining the
Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 99 MICH. L. REV. 238, 245 &
nn. 38 & 39 (2000) (listing the Second, Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits as favoring this
limitation and the First, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Third Circuits as opposing it).
347. See Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2178 (Breyer,J., dissenting) ("The question is not what police
might have done had they not behaved unlawfully. The question is what they did do. Was there
set in motion an independent chain of events that would have inevitably led to the discovery
and seizure of the evidence .... ").
348. 1 LAFAVE, supranote 42, at 278-79 (emphasis added).
349.
See YALE KAMISAR, WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, MODERN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 919 (11th ed. 2005).
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narrowly emphasized the fact that the search party in that case was already at
work.
Justice Stevens wrote in a concurring opinion:
The uncertainty as to whether the body would have been
discovered can be resolved in [the state's] favor here only because
...petitioner adduced evidence demonstrating that at the time of
the constitutional violation an investigation was already under way
which, in the natural and probable course of events, would have
350
soon discovered the body.
Justice Brennan's dissent declared, "[T]he Court concludes that
unconstitutionally obtained evidence may be admitted at trial if it inevitably
would have been discovered in the same condition by an independent line
of investigation that was already being pursued when the constitutional
1
violation occurred.

35

Although the Nix majority did not say that "an independent line of
investigation already being pursued" was necessary, it lent some color to
Justice Brennan's characterization when it wrote that "inevitable discovery
involves no speculative elements but focuses on demonstrated historical facts
capable of ready verification."' 352 A police officer's testimony about the
virtuous things he would have done if he had not done the unconstitutional
things is not testimony about demonstrated historical facts and often is
incapable of verification.
Whether a lawful investigation was already underway is of evidentiary
significance in resolving questions of inevitable discovery and but-for
causation. An active investigation obviously makes lawful discovery more
likely. In addition, there is often more reason to credit testimony about an
ongoing investigation than to credit the statements of police officers about
what they would have done in a counterfactual world.
The active-pursuit limitation, however, requires courts to draw a yes-orno line somewhere along a spectrum of investigative plans and activities and
to specify the moment when an investigation begins. Was the search in Nix
underway as soon as an official of the Iowa Bureau of Criminal Investigation
decided to conduct it? As soon as this official told someone else of his
plan? 353 As soon as he announced the plan publically? As soon as he sought
volunteers? As soon as he assessed what resources were available and
decided where to search? As soon as the search team assembled? As soon as
350.

Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 456-57 (1984) (Stevens,J., concurring).

351.

Id. at 459 (Brennan,J., dissenting).

352.

Id. at 444 (majority opinion).

353.

See United States v. Hammons, 152 F.3d 1025, 1029-30 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that

the government "was actively pursuing a substantial, alternative line of investigation at the time
of the constitutional violation" because the officer who violated the Constitution by coercing a
suspect's consent had said prior to this violation that, if he failed to obtain the suspect's
consent, he would send for a drug-detecting dog).
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it took the field? Might it have been enough that the Iowa Bureau of
Criminal Investigation previously had conducted large-scale searches for the
bodies of murder victims and surely would have done so again?
The more active the pursuit, the more evidentiary significance it has.
Rather than litigate about where to locate the start line, courts might
examine the entire spectrum of police plans, preparations, and investigative
activities. And they might look at other things too. Active pursuit is
significant only as evidence, and it is not the only significant evidence.
Williams might have placed his victim's body in the public square so
that it would be discovered at daybreak. If he had, the body's lawful
discovery would have been more certain than in Nix itself, yet the police
might not have begun a search or other "active pursuit" at the time Detective
Learning delivered the Christian burial speech. Admitting evidence of the
body in Nix and not in a case in which Williams had brought Learning to the
public square would make little sense. The active-pursuit limitation guards
against self-serving police testimony, but it restricts the inevitable discovery
exception artificially.
8.

Limiting Inevitable Discovery.

In one respect, the active-pursuit limitation seems not only artificial but
backwards. Responding to the Eighth Circuit's concern that, without a goodfaith caveat, the inevitable discovery doctrine would reduce the "'deterrent
effect of the Exclusionary Rule ...

too far,"' 354 the Supreme Court wrote in

Nix, "A police officer who is faced with the opportunity to obtain evidence
will rarely, if ever, be in a position to calculate whether the evidence sought
would inevitably be discovered."3 55 The more active the investigation,
however, the more likely an officer is to take account of it in deciding
whether to take a shortcut.
In Giffin,35 6 for example, the police were actively pursuing a course that
would have led to the lawful discovery of evidence. One agent was seeking a
search warrant when the other agents broke into the defendant's home.3 57 A
magistrate later issued the warrant, leaving no doubt that the course of
investigation already underway would have led to lawful discovery. The Sixth
Circuit, however, recognized the risk of abuse and did not allow the police
to take advantage of the investigation already begun.
The invitation to shortcuts issued by the inevitable discovery doctrine
seems especially clear in LaFave's second category of "relatively easy" casesthose in which "the circumstances are such that, pursuant to some
standardized procedures or established routine a certain evidence-revealing

354.
355.
356.
357.

Nix, 467 U.S. at 445 (quoting Williams v. Nix, 700 F.2d 1164, 1169 n.5 (8th Cir.1983)).
Id.
United States v. Griffin, 502 F.2d 959 (6th Cir. 1974) (discussed supraPart VI.F.5).
Id. at 960.
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event would definitely have occurred later."358 Courts frequently invoke the
inevitable discovery exception to admit evidence that the police have
obtained by searching automobiles without probable cause. The courts note
that, if the police had not searched a vehicle unlawfully, they or other
officers would have towed it to an impound lot where an officer would have
inventoried its contents. The courts then find that the improperly seized
3 59
evidence would have been discovered at the time of the inventory search.
The effect of these rulings is to assure the police that whenever they observe
a vehicle in a place from which it is likely to be towed they may search it
unlawfully without fear of exclusionary consequences.
LaFave excoriates Hudson for accepting the government's argument
that "if we hadn't done it wrong, we would have done it right."3 60 In the
inevitable discovery decisions that he approves, however, the government's
argument is no different. The government maintains, "This is an easy case. If
we hadn't done it wrong, we would have done it right when we conducted
an inventory search or when the independent line of investigation we were
already pursuing bore fruit."
Indeed, in every inevitable discovery case, the government makes one of
two arguments. It says either "if we hadn't done it wrong, we would have
done it right" or "if we hadn't done it wrong, someone else would have done
it right." Neither of these claims is attractive, but the claim that "someone
else would have done it right" is less troubling. This claim is less likely to rest
on the testimony of the offending officers themselves and is less likely to
describe a discovery that they anticipated. Perhaps the inevitable discovery
exception should be limited to cases in which a private party or a
governmental agency other than the offending law enforcement agency
would have discovered the unlawfully obtained evidence.
More basically, limitations of the inevitable discovery exception should
focus less on ensuring the inevitability of the discovery (as the active-pursuit
limitation does) and more on ensuring that the doctrine does not
encourage violations of the Fourth Amendment (as the Griffin limitation
does and as the good-faith limitation rejected in Nix would have). This
Article has noted the Supreme Court's statement in Nix that "[a] police
officer who is faced with the opportunity to obtain evidence will rarely, if
ever, be in a position to calculate whether the evidence sought would
inevitably be discovered. ",36 1 An appropriate restriction might take this
statement seriously and limit the inevitable discovery exception to cases in
which the offending officers could not have anticipated someone else's

1 LAFAVE, supra note 42, at 278-79.
359.
See, e.g.,
United States v. Mendez, 315 F.3d 132, 137-39 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v.
Kimes, 246 F.3d 800, 803-05 (6th Cir. 2001).
358.

360.

See supratext accompanying note 76.

361.

Nix, 467 U.S. at 445.

HeinOnline -- 93 Iowa L. Rev. 1814 2007-2008

THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND CA USA TION

1815

discovery of the challenged evidence.3 62 Any inevitable discovery exception
is incompatible with the standard of contributory causation advocated by
this Article, but if the exception were modified to disallow the argument that
"if we hadn't done it wrong, we would have done it right," a contributorycausation standard could be relaxed to accommodate it.
Moreover, something like an inevitable discovery exception seems
essential in one situation. Courts should not use the exclusionary rule to
suppress publicly available information. The police might have beaten a
suspect with a phone book to force him to reveal his phone number, but
even this conduct should not lead courts to suppress the phone number if
the police or anyone else could just have opened the book and found it. An
unlawful police action should not prevent the use of publicly available
information forever. 363 One could invoke causal principles to support this
result (if the police had not beaten the suspect, they inevitably would have
discovered his phone number lawfully), but one also could state the rule
without reference to causal principles (the Constitution never requires the
suppression of publicly available information).
G.

BRINGING ALONG THE CURIOUS-WILSON v. LAYNE

In Wilson v. Layne, police officers violated the Fourth Amendment by
allowing journalists to accompany them when they entered a home to make
an arrest. 364 The case presented no issue under the exclusionary rule, but
the Supreme Court observed in a footnote:
[I]f the police are lawfully present, the violation of the Fourth
Amendment is the presence of the media and not the presence of
the police in the home. We have no occasion here to decide
whether the exclusionary rule would apply to any evidence
365
discovered or developed by the media representatives.

362.

One difficulty with this suggested limitation of the inevitable discovery doctrine is that

the limitation does not seem to fit the facts of Nix. Formally, Nix was a case in which the
government maintained, "If we hadn't done it wrong, someone else would have done it right."
Detective Learning was a member of the Des Moines Police Department. Another agency, the
Iowa Bureau of Criminal Investigation, was conducting the search for Pamela Powers's body.
Nevertheless, Detective Leaming was aware of the search, and the two agencies were working
together. Once Williams began cooperating by leading unsuccessful searches for the victim's
shoes and a blanket-even before he agreed to reveal the body's location-the agents
supervising the search called it off. These agents joined Learning before the body was
discovered. Id. at 435-36.
363. See United States ex rel. Roberts v. Terntllo, 407 F. Supp. 1172, 1178 (E.D.N.Y. 1976)
(holding that the use of an improper subpoena to obtain mechanics liens does not require
suppression of the liens when they were on file in the county clerk's office under the names of
the defendant's businesses).
364. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999).
365. Id. at 614 n.2.
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The presence of reporters or other unauthorized parties during a
search does not contribute to the discovery of evidence. Although their
presence violates the Fourth Amendment, a contributory-causation standard
would not require the suppression of evidence seized during the search.
Were the unauthorized parties actively to aid the police in their search,
however, the result would be different. Their help would have made the
discovery of evidence easier whether they discovered this evidence
themselves or simply saved the police from searching in unproductive
places. Unlike a standard of but-for causation, a standard of contributory
causation would require suppression of the evidence they had helped seize.
VII. CONCLUSION
Here is a plan for removing the teeth from Mirandav. Arizona.
Empirical studies show that more than three-quarters of all suspects
under interrogation waive their Miranda rights. 366 Miranda has reduced the
rate at which suspects confess very slightly or not at all.367 A reasonable
inference from the studies is that, when the police have secured a confession
in violation of Miranda, they probably would have obtained this confession
even if they had complied with Miranda. Accordingly, under the logic of
Hudson v. Michigan, the suspect's confession should not be suppressed. The
Mirandaviolation was not a but-for cause of the confession. Hudson produces
a Mirandaeven Torquemada could live with.3 68
But something is wrong with this picture. This illustration 369 reveals that
requiring a but-for causal relationship between a governmental wrong and
the challenged evidence is neither natural nor inevitable nor "unassailable"
in the administration of an exclusionary rule. No one seems ever to have
suggested that a concept of but-for causation should limit the rule that
confessions obtained following Mirandaviolations must be excluded.
Rather than envision the issue as one of but-for causation, someone
might say of a case in which the police obtained a confession without giving
the Mirandawarnings:
366.
See Richard A. Leo, Inside the InterrogationRoom, 86J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 286
(1996); see also Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical
Study of the Effects ofMiranda, 43 UCLA L. REv. 839, 859 (1996).
367.
Compare Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An EmpiricalAssessment, 90 Nw. U. L.
REV. 387, 438 (1996) (claiming that 3.8 percent of the suspects who would have been convicted
before Miranda avoided conviction by virtue of that decision), with Stephen J. Schulhofer,

Miranda's PracticalEffect: SubstantialBenefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REX'.
500, 506 (1996) (showing that Cassell's research was seriously defective and that the figure was
at most 0.78 percent in the immediate post-Mirandaperiod).
368. The suspect certainly should be afforded an opportunity to show that his case differs
from the norm and that the inference drawn from the empirical evidence does not fit. In the

absence of a but-for causal relationship between the Miranda violation and the suspect's
confession, however, Hudson suggests that the confession should be received.
369. 1 have borrowed the illustration from Craig Bradley and embellished it. See Bradley,
supra note 282, at 913.
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The suspect had a right to these warnings, and the required
warnings might have made a difference. The police made their task
of securing a confession easier by omitting them. They left out a
required step and unlawfully tilted the odds in their favor. The law
them
should provide an incentive for them to do what it instructs
370
suppressed.
be
should
confession
suspect's
to do, and the
This Article has sought to make sentiments like these operational by
developing a concept of contributory causation.
Prior to the decision in Hudson, no more than one-and-one-half
Supreme Court decisions were clearly inconsistent with the standard of
contributory causation proposed by this Article. They were Nix v. Williams, in
which the Court approved an inevitable discovery exception to the
exclusionary rule, and one-half of New York v. Harris, in which the Court
admitted one of two statements a suspect made after the police arrested him
unlawfully inside his home without a warrant. 37 1 Dozens of decisions,
however (including the other half of Harris and such Fourth Amendment
landmarks as Weeks and Mapp), were compatible with a contributorycausation standard and plainly inconsistent with the standard of but-for
causation articulated in Hudson. In fact, a standard of contributory causation
would be more restrictive of the exclusionary rule than the one the Supreme
Court traditionally has applied. Traditionally, the Court has called police
officers who fail to obtain a warrant or fail to knock trespassers and has
ordered the suppression of whatever evidence their wrongful presence
enabled them to obtain.
Hudson may give rise to an inevitable discovery doctrine without the
limitations that lower courts have created in an effort to civilize it. The
Supreme Court may hold, for example, that, as long as the police had
probable cause for a search, their unlawful failure to obtain a warrant was
not a but-for cause of their seizure, for they would have made this seizure
even if they had complied with the Constitution. But the Court is unlikely to
press Hudson's logic to the point of overruling the many cases inconsistent
with it. The requirement of but-for causation may instead become part of
the "formulaic constitution"-invoked on some occasions and silently
disregarded on others.37 2 The law of the exclusionary rule may remain ad
hoc and incoherent, and tension may persist between the older cases that do
not require but-for causation and the newer cases that sometimes do. Were
the courts to attempt to resolve this tension without destroying the
exclusionary rule, the concept of contributory causation could be useful.
The Supreme Court has not yet said of the failure to give Mirandawarnings, "As far as
370.
we know, civil liability is an effective deterrent here." See Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159,
2167-68 (2006).
Two other decisions-Segura v. United States and Murray v.United States--were arguably
371.

in tension with the proposed contributory-causation standard. See supra Part VI.D-E.
372. See Robert F. Nagel, The FormulaicConstitution, 84 MICH. L. REv. 165, 165-69 (1985).
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